Magno vs. CA (Crim1)

Oriel Magno, petitioner, vs. Honorable Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines, respondents.

June 26, 1992

Paras, J:

Facts:

• Oriel Magno, lacking fund in acquiring complete set of equipment to make his car repair shop operational, approached Corazon Teng, Vice President of Mancor Industries.
• VP Teng referred Magno to LS Finance and Management Corporation, advising its Vice President, Joey Gomez, that Mancor was willing to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS Finance could accommodate Magno and and provide him credit facilities.
• The arrangement went on requiring Magno to pay 30% of the total amount of the equipment as warranty deposit but Magno couldn't afford to pay so he requested VP Gomez to look for third party who could lend him that amount.
• Without Magno's knowledge, Corazon was the one who provided that amount.
• As payment to the equipment, Magno issued six checks, two of them were cleared and the rest had no sufficient fund.
• Because of the unsuccessful venture, Magno failed to pay LS Finance which then pulled out the equipment.
• Magno was charged of violation of BP Blg. 2 (The Bouncing Checks Law) and found guilty.

Issue:

• Whether or not Magno should be punished for the issuance of the checks in question.

Held:

• No

Ratio: 

• To charge Magno for the refund of a warranty deposit which he did not withdraw as it was not his own account, it having remained with LS Finance, is to even make him pay an unjust debt since he did not receive the amount in question. All the while, said amount was in the safekeeping of the financing company which is managed by the officials and employees of LS Finance.

People vs. Oanis (Crim1)

The People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta, defendant-appellants.

July 27, 1943

Moran, J:

Facts:

• Chief of Police Antonio Oanis and Corporal Alberto Galanta were instructed by the Constabulary Provincial Inspector to arrest the escaped convict, Anselmo Balagtas, with bailarina named Irene, and if overpowered, to get him dead or alive.
• Upon arrival at the place where Irene could be found, Oanis approached and asked Brigada Mallare where Irene's room was. Brigada indicated the room and said that Irene was sleeping with her paramour.
• Oanis and Galanta then went to the room and upon seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the door, they simultaneously fired at him.
• Shocked by the entire scene, Irene fainted.
• It turned out later that the man shot and killed was not Balagtas but an innocent man named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour.

Issue:

• Whether or not Oanis and Galanta can be held responsible for Tecson's death.

Held:

• Yes

Ratio:

• No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention. A peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary or unreasonable force in making an arrest.
• Through impatience of desire to take chances, Oanis and Galanta have exceeded in the fulfillment of their duty by killing the person whom they believed to be Balagtas without any resistance from him and without making any previous inquiry as to his identity.

People v. De La Cruz (Crim1)

People of the Philippines v. Pablo De La Cruz
People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Pablo De La Cruz, Defendant Appellant

En Banc
Doctrine: Neither excessive fines nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
Keywords: excessive fines
Date: April 17, 1953
Ponente: Justice Bengzon

Facts: 

• In the morning of October 14, 1950, Eduardo Bernardo, Jr. went to the De La Cruz's store in Sampaloc, Manila, and purchased from him a six-ounce tin of "Carnation" milk for thirty centavos. 
• As the purchase had been made for Ruperto Austria, who was not in good terms with Pablo de la Cruz the matter reached the City Fiscal's office and resulted in this criminal prosecution, because Executive Order No. 331 (issued by authority of Republic Act No. 509) fixed 20 centavos as the maximum price for that kind of commodity.
• Republic Act No. 509 provides in part as follows:
• SEC. 12. Imprisonment for a period of not less two months nor more than twelve years or a fine of not less than two thousand pesos nor more than ten thousand pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who sells any article, goods, or commodity in excess of the maximum selling price fixed by the president; . . . .
• In addition to the penalties prescribed above, the persons, corporations, partnerships, or associations found guilty of any violation of this Act or of any rule or regulations issued by the president pursuant to this Act shall be barred from the wholesome and retail business for a period of five years for a first offense, and shall be permanently barred for the second or succeeding offenses.
• Having retailed a can of milk at ten centavos more than the ceiling price, Pablo de la Cruz was sentenced, after trial, in the court of first instance of Manila, to imprisonment for five years, and to pay a fine of five thousand pesos plus costs. He was also barred from engaging in wholesale and retail business for five years.

Issue/s:

1. WON the trial judge erred in imposing a punishment wholly disproportionate to the offence
2. WON the trial judge erred in not invalidating RA No. 509 in so far as it prescribed excessive penalties.
1. Is imprisonment for two months or fine of two thousand pesos too excessive for a merchant who sells goods at prices beyond the ceilings established in the Executive Order?
2. Is five years and five thousand pesos, cruel and unusual for a violation that merely netted a ten-centavo profit to the accused?

Held: We may decrease the penalty, exercising that discretion vested in the courts by the same statutory enactment. Wherefore, reducing the imprisonment to six months and the fine to two thousand pesos, we hereby affirm the appealed decision in all other respects.


Ratio:

• The constitution directs that "Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."
•  The prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and apply to punishment which never existed in America of which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete (15 Am. Jur., p. 172), for instance those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like (15 Am. Jur., supra, Note 35 L.R.A. p. 561). 
• Fine and imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition.
• However, there are respectable authorities holding that the inhibition applies as well to punishments that although not cruel and unusual in nature, may be so severe as to fall within the fundamental restriction. (15 Am. Jur., p. 178)
• For the purposes of this decision, we may assume, without actually holding, that too long a prison term might clash with the Philippine Constitution. But that brings up again two opposing theories
• we are told the prohibition applies to legislation only, and not to the courts' decision imposing penalties within the limits of the statute (15 Am. Jur., "Criminal Law" sec. 526). 
• the section would violate the Constitution, if the penalty is excessive under any and all circumstances, the minimum being entirely out of proportion to the kind of offenses prescribed
• Is imprisonment for two months or fine of two thousand pesos too excessive for a merchant who sells goods at prices beyond the ceilings established in the Executive Order?
• NO. because in overstepping the price barriers Dela Cruz might derive, in some instances, profits amounting to thousands of pesos
• The prison term must be so disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of all reasonable men as to what is right and proper under the circumstances (lb.). 
• authorities are not lacking to the effect that the fundamental prohibition likewise restricts the judge's power and authority
• The second theory would contrast the penalty imposed by the court with the gravity of the particular crime or misdemeanor, and if notable disparity results, it would apply the constitutional brake, even if the statute would, under other circumstances, be not extreme or oppressive.
• Is five years and five thousand pesos, cruel and unusual for a violation that merely netted a ten-centavo profit to the accused?
• NO.
• In our opinion the damage caused to the State is not measured exclusively by the gains obtained by the accused, inasmuch as one violation would mean others, and the consequential breakdown of the beneficial system of price controls.

People of the Philippines v. Carlos (CRIM1)

Note: didn't include all arguments of Carlos. Only included the one abt equal protection.


People of the Philippines v. Carlos
People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Apolonio Carlos, Defendant Appellant

En Banc

Doctrine: Due process & equal protection

Keywords: Equal Protection

Date: June 30, 1947

Ponente: Justice Tuason

Facts: 

• The appellant was found guilty of treason by the People's Court and sentenced to reclusion perpetua, to pay a fine of P7,000, and costs.
• background lang on why: The lower court found that one day in July or August, 1944, about two or three o'clock in the morning, a truck pulled up to the curb in front of a house on Constancia Street, Sampaloc, Manila, where one Martin Mateo lived. From the truck the accused, a Japanese spy, alighted together with members of the Japanese military police and pointed Martin Mateo's house and Fermin Javier's house to his Japanese companions, whereupon the Japanese soldiers broke into Martin Mateo's dwelling first and Fermin Javier's afterwards. In those houses they seized Martin Mateo, Ladislao Mateo and Fermin Javier, bound their hands, and put them in the truck. Along with other persons who had been rounded up in the other places and who had been kept in the truck while it was parked, they were taken to Fort Santiago where the two Mateos and Fermin Javier were tortured and from which they were released six days later. The reason for the arrest and maltreatment of Martin and Ladislao Mateo was that they had refused to divulge the whereabouts of their brother, Marcelino Mateo, who was a guerrilla and who had escaped from the Japanese. And Fermin Javier was arrested and tortured because he himself was a guerrilla, a fact which Carlos knew or at least suspected.
• Carlos alleged that the law creating the People's Court is unconstitutional; that numerous provisions of the People's Court Act are singled out as contrary to the Organic Law

Issue: WON the People's Court Act (PCA) is unconstitutional.

Held: No. The judgment of the lower court is affirmed with costs against appellant.

Ratio:

• Carlos argued that The PCA contained
• provisions which deal on matters entirely foreign to the subject matter expressed in its 
• title, such as: 
• (1) a provision which retains the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance;
• (2) a provision which adds to the disqualification of Justices of the Supreme Court 
• and provides a procedure for their substitution; 
• (3) a provision which changed the 
• existing Rules of Court on the subject of bail, and 
• (4) a provision which suspends 
• Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Municipality of Binalonan: The People's Court was intended to be a full and complete scheme with its own machinery for the indictment, trial and judgment of treason case. The various provisos mentioned, in our opinion, are allied and germane to the subject matter and purposes of the People's Court Act; they are subordinate to its end. The multitude of matters which the legislation, by its nature, has to embrace would make mention of all of them in the title of the act cumbersome. It is not necessary, and the Congress is not expected, to make the title of an enactment a complete index of its contents.
• SC: The constitutional rule is satisfied if all parts of a law relate to the subject expressed in its title.
• Carlos also argued that PCA deprives persons similarly situated of the equal protection of the laws inasmuch as:
• (1) Only those political offenders against whom cases are filed within six months from the passage of the law are to be tried in the People's Court, while others are to be tried in the Courts of First Instance;
• SC: The People's Court is a court of special and restricted jurisdiction created under the stress of an emergency and national security. It was devised to operate for a limited period only, a limitation imposed by economic necessity and other factors of public policy. Obviously, the main concerning the creation of a special court was the trial and and disposition of the cases, numbering over 6,000, of accused who were being held by the United States military authorities and who were to be turned over to the Commonwealth Government.
• (2) Political offenders accused in the People's Court are denied preliminary examination and/or investigation whereas the others who shall be entitled thereto;
• SC:  Section 22 in denying preliminary investigation to persons accused before the People's Court is justified by the conditions prevailing when the law was enacted. In view of the great number of prisoners then under detention and the length of time and amount of labor that would be consumed if so many prisoners were allowed the right to have preliminary investigation, considered with the necessity of disposing of these cases at the earliest possible dates in the interest of the public and of the accused themselves, it was not an unwise measure which dispensed with such investigation in such cases. Preliminary investigation, it must be remembered, is not a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution.
• (3) Political offenders accused in the People's Court have limited right to appeal, while those who may be accused of the same crimes in the Courts of First Instance have absolute right of appeal inasmuch as under section 13 of the law, Rules 42 and 46 of the Rules of Court are made applicable to the latter;
• SC: The People's Court is a collegiate court whereas the Court of First Instance is presided over by a single judge. Appeal is not a constitutional but statutory right. The admitted fact that there is no discrimination among appeals from the same court or class of court saves the provision objected to from being unconstitutional
• (4) Appeals in the case involving persons who held any office or position under either or both the Philippine Executive Commission and the Philippine Republic or any branch, instrumentality and/or agency thereof are to heard and decided by a substantially different Supreme Court, thus causing lack of informity in rulings over the same subject;
• SC: This objection does not seem to fall within the subject of constitutional guarantee against deprivation of equal protection of the laws. Be that as it may, we find no merit in the appellant's contention. 
• SC: The disqualification under the People's Court Act of some or a majority of the members of this Court and their substitution by justices of the Court of Appeals or judges of the Courts of First Instance do not make the Supreme Court, as thus constituted, a new court in the eyes of the law. 
• SC: A court is an entity possessing a personality separate and distinct from the men who compose or sit on it. This objection is no more valid than that of a party in an ordinary action who protests that his case is heard by a Supreme Court which, by reason of disability of a majority of its regular members, is made up mostly of judges from outside. 
• SC: As to the "lack of uniformity in rulings over the same subject," it need only be said that the Constitution does not insure uniformity of judicial decisions; neither does it assure immunity from judicial error.
• (5) The first proviso of section 19 thereof prescribes a different rule as to the granting of release on bail only with respect to the political offenders detained by the United States Army and released to the Commonwealth of the Philippines but not as to others political offenders accused or accusable of the same crimes; and
• (6) The second proviso of section 19 thereof suspends article 125 of the Revised Penal Code only as to those political detainees released by the United States Army to the Commonwealth of the Philippines or, at most, only to those accused or accusable of the crimes specified in the law and not as to all persons accused or accusable of crimes against national security committed during the second world war, much less to all offenders, notwithstanding the fact that there is no reasonable and real difference among said groups of offenders.
• SC: (5) and (6) The two provisos in section 19 do no constitute denial of equal protection of the laws. The distinction made by these provisos between two sets of accused in the "granting or release on bail" and in the application of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code are not arbitrary or fanciful calculated to favor or prejudice one or the other class.
• Laurel vs. Misa (76 Phil., 372): this Court explained the reasons which necessitated the extension to six months of the authorized detention of persons charged with treason before filing of information. The provisos rest "on some real and substantial difference or distinction bearing a just and fair relation to the legislation."
• Carlos argued that (c) It is a bill of attainder in that it virtually imposes upon specific, known and identified individuals or group of individual, the penalty of detention and imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months without any form of judicial trial or procedure
• Cummings vs. Missouri: The bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial."
• SC: Detention of a prisoner for a period not exceeding six months pending investigation or trial is not a punishment but a necessary extension of the well-recognized power to hold the criminal suspected for investigation

Adiong v. COMELEC (CRIM1)

ADIONG vs. COMELEC

Blo Umpar Adiong, plaintiff v. Commission on elections, defendants

En Banc

Doctrine: Due process & equal protection

Keywords: void for overbreadth

Date: March 31, 1992

Ponente: Justice Gutierrez Jr.

Facts:

·         On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its powers granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws.

·         Section 15(a) of the resolution provides:

o    Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. — The following are lawful election propaganda:

(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals… Provided, That decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof.

·         Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:

Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda. —

It is unlawful:…

(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or billboards…

·         Petitioner Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections assails the COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646.

Issue: WON the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes.

Held: Petition is GRANTED. The portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution No. 2347 of the Commission on Elections providing that "decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof" is DECLARED NULL and VOID.

Ratio:

·         The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction involved in this case.

o    Thomas v. Collins: All of the protections expressed in the Bill of Rights are important but we have accorded to free speech the status of a preferred freedom

o    Mutuc v. COMELEC: the preferred freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage

o    It is difficult to imagine how the other provisions of the Bill of Rights and the right to free elections may be guaranteed if the freedom to speak and to convince or persuade is denied and taken away.

o    Too many restrictions will deny to people the robust, uninhibited, and wide open debate, the generating of interest essential if our elections will truly be free, clean and honest.

o    For persons who have to resort to judicial action to strike down requirements which they deem inequitable or oppressive, a court case may prove to be a hollow remedy. The judicial process, by its very nature, requires time for rebuttal, analysis and reflection. We cannot act instantly on knee-jerk impulse. By the time we revoke an unallowably restrictive regulation or ruling, time which is of the essence to a candidate may have lapsed and irredeemable opportunities may have been lost.

o    When faced with border line situations where freedom to speak by a candidate or party and freedom to know on the part of the electorate are invoked against actions intended for maintaining clean and free elections, the police, local officials and COMELEC, should lean in favor of freedom.

o    National Press Club v. COMELEC : A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government, if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest

o    The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does not endanger any substantial government interest

·  The questioned prohibition premised on the statute and as couched in the resolution is void for overbreadth.

o    Zwickler v. Koota(19 L ed 2d 444 [1967]) : A statute is considered void for overbreadth when "it offends the constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."

o    In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.

§  Holden v. Hardy: Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns. It is elementary that it includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of it. The Constitution protects these essential attributes of property.

§  We have to consider the fact that in the posting of decals and stickers on cars and other moving vehicles, the candidate needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. In such a case, the prohibition would not only deprive the owner who consents to such posting of the decals and stickers the use of his property but more important, in the process, it would deprive the citizen of his right to free speech and information

·         The constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII, section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles. It is to be reiterated that the posting of decals and stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen becomes crucial in this kind of election propaganda not the financial resources of the candidate.

·         In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution

US vs. Guinto (Consti1)

En Banc

Cruz, February 26,1990

Topic: Sovereignty - Suits not against the state - Failure to raise immunity as defense

Facts:

•  In the 4 consolidated suits, the USA moves to dismiss the cases on the ground that they are in effect suits against it which it has not consented

On the first suit:

• On February 24, 1986, the Western Pacific Contracting Office, Okinawa Area Exchange, US Air Force, solicited bids for barber services contracts through its contracting officer James F. Shaw
• Among those who submitted their bids were private respondents Roberto T. Valencia, Emerenciana C. Tanglao, and Pablo C. del Pilar
• Bidding was won by Ramon Dizon over the objection of the private respondents who claimed that he had made a bid for 4 facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area which was not included in the invitation to bid
• The Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX), through its representatives petitioners Yvonne Reeves and Frederic M. Smouse, upon the private respondents' complaint, explained that the Civil Engineering concession had not been awarded to Dizon
• But Dizon was alreayd operating this concession, then known as the NCO club concession
• On June 30, 1986, the private respondents filed a complaint in the court below to compel PHAX and the individual petitioners to cancel the award to Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for the barbershop concessions and to allow the private respondents by a writ of preliminary injunction to continue operating the concessions pending litigation
• Respondent court directed the individual petitioners to maintain the status quo
• On July 22, 1986, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for preliminary injunction on the ground that the action was in effect a suit against USA which had not waived its non-suability
• On July 22, 1986, trial court denied the application for a writ of preliminary injunction
• On Oct. 10, 1988, trial court denied the petitioners' motion to dismiss

On the second suit:

•  Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Anthony Lamachia, Wilfredo Belsa, Rose Cartalla and Peter Orascion for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City
• It had been ascertained that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers
• His dismissal was effected on March 5, 1986 by Col. David C. Kimball, Commander of the 3rd Combat Support Group, PACAF Clark Air Force Base
• Genove filed a complaint in the RTC of Baguio
• The defendants, joined by the United States of America, moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that Lamachia (the manager) as an officer of the US Air Force was immune from suit for the acts done by him in his official capacity; they argued that the suit was in effect against USA, which had not given its consent to be sued
• Motion was denied by respondent judge: although acting intially in their official capacities, the defendants went beyond what their functions called for; this brought them out of the protective mantle of whatever immunities they may have had in the beginning

On the third suit:

• Luis Bautisa, who was employed as a barracks boy in Camp O'Donnell, an extension of Clark Air Base, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by the individual petitioners Tomi J. King, Darrel D. Dye and Stephen F. Bostick, officers of the US Air Force and special agents of the Air Force of Special Investigators (AFOSI)
• Bautista was dismissed from his employment as a result of the filing of the charge
• He then filed a complaint for damages against the individual petitioners, claiming that it was because of their acts that he was removed
• Defendants alleged that they had only done their duty in the enforcement of laws of the Philippines inside the American bases, pursuant to the RP-US Military Bases Agreement
•  The counsel for the defense invoked that the defendants were acting in their official capacity; that the complaint was in effect a suit against the US without its consent
• Motion was denied by respondent judge: immunity under the Military Bases Agreement covered only criminal and not civil cases; moreover, the defendants had come under the jurisdiction of the court when they submitted their answer

On the fourth suit:

• Complaint for damages was filed by private respondents against the petitioners (except USA)
• According to the plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up, handcuffed the, and unleashed dogs on them
• Defendants deny this and claim that the plaintiffs were arrested for theft and were bitten by dogs because they were struggling and resisting arrest
• USA and the defendants argued that the suit was in effect a suit against the United States which had not given its consent to be sued; that they were also immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by them in the performance of their official functions
• Motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court: the acts cannot be considered Acts of State, if they were ever admitted by the defendants

Issue:

• Whether or not the suits above are in effect suits against United States of America without its consent
• In relation, whether or not the defendants are also immune from suit for acting within their official functions.

Holding and Ratio:

• 1st suit: No. The barbershops concessions are commercial enterprises operated by private persons. They are not agencies of the US Armed forces. Petitioners cannot plead immunity. Case should be remanded to the lower court.
• 2nd suit: No. The petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity. The restaurants are commercial enterprises. By entering into the employment contract with Genove, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. (However, the petitioners are only suable, not liable.)
• 3rd suit: Yes. It is clear that the petitioners were acting in the exercise of their official functions. For discharging their duties as agents of the US, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts attributable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued.
• 4th suit: The contradictory factual allegations deserve a closer study. Inquiry must first be made by the lower court. Only after can it be known in what capacity the petitioners were acting at the time of the incident.

Republic vs. Villasor (Consti1)

Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Hon. Guillermo P. Villasor, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, the Sheriff of the City of Manila, the Clerk of Court of First Instance of Cebu, P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation, respondents.

November 28, 1973

Fernando, J:

Facts:

• The decision that was rendered in favor of respondents P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd, Gavino Unchuan and International Construction Corporation was declared final and executory by Respondent Hon. Guillermo P. Villasor.
• Pursuant to the said declaration, the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution was issued. And for the strength of this writ, the provincial sheriff served notices of garnishment with several banks, specially on the 'monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the form of deposits; the Philippines Veterans Bank received the same notice of garnishment.
• The funds of the AFP on deposit with the banks are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retireees, pay and allowances of military and civillian personnel and for maintenance and operations of AFP.
• Petitioner filed a petition against Villasor for acting in excess jurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of a Writ of Execution against the properties of AFP, hence the notices and garnishments are null and void.

Issue:

• Whether or not the Writ of Execution issued by respondent Judge Villasor is valid.

Held:

• No

Ratio:

• What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution. It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state and its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. A sovereign is exempt from suit not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.