People v. Echegaray (CRIM1)

People of the Philippines v. Leo Echegaray y Pilo
People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee v.  Leo Echegaray y Pilo, Defendant Appellant

Per Curiam
Doctrine: Neither excessive fines nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
Date: February 7, 1997
Ponente: As it is a Per curiam decision, the court is acting collectively & anonymously.

Facts:

• The SC rendered a decision in the instant case affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant for the crime of raping his ten-year old daughter. 
• The crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death.
• The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration which focused on the sinister motive of the victim's grandmother that precipitated the filing of the alleged false accusation of rape against the accused.  The motion was dismissed as the SC found no substantial arguments on the said motion that can disturb the verdict.
• On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and retained the services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group of the Philippines. (FLAG)
• A supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accused-appellant aiming for the reversal of the death sentence.
• In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main issues: (1) mixed factual and legal matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2) alleged incompetence of accused-appellant's former counsel; and (3) purely legal question of the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.

Issue/s: WON the death penalty law (RA no. 7659) is unconstitutional

Held: No.

Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration & supplemental motion for reconsideration are denied for lack of merit.

Ratio:

• Accused-appellant first claims that the death penalty is per se a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment as ruled by the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia. To state, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court, in Furman, categorically ruled that the death penalty is a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, is misleading and inaccurate.
• The issue in Furman was not so much death penalty itself but the arbitrariness pervading the procedures by which the death penalty was imposed on the accused by the sentencing jury.  Thus, the defense theory in Furman centered not so much on the nature of the death penalty as a criminal sanction but on the discrimination against the black accused who is meted out the death penalty by a white jury that is given the unconditional discretion to determine whether or not to impose the death penalty.
• Furman, thus, did not outlaw the death penalty because it was cruel and unusual per se.  While the U.S. Supreme Court nullified all discretionary death penalty statutes in Furman, it did so because the discretion which these statutes vested in the trial judges and sentencing juries was uncontrolled and without any parameters, guidelines, or standards intended to lessen, if not altogether eliminate, the intervention of personal biases, prejudices and discriminatory acts on the part of the trial judges and sentencing juries.
• accused-appellant asseverates that the death penalty is a cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment for the crime of rape mainly because the latter, unlike murder, does not involve the taking of life.  
• In support of his contention, accused-appellant largely relies on the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in Coker v. Georgia:: "Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public, it does not compare with murder, which does involve the unjustified taking of human life.  Although it may be accompanied by another crime, rape by definition does not include the death of or even the serious injury to another person.  The murderer kills; the rapist, if no more than that, does not.  Life is over for the victim of the murderer; for the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is not over and normally is not beyond repair.  We have the abiding conviction that the death penalty, which 'is unique in its severity and irrevocability' x x x  is an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take human life"
• The U.S. Supreme Court based its foregoing ruling on two grounds: 
• first, that the public has manifested its rejection of the death penalty as a proper punishment for the crime of rape through the willful omission by the state legislatures to include rape in their new death penalty statutes in the aftermath of Furman;
• Phil. SC: Anent the first ground, we fail to see how this could have any bearing on the Philippine experience and in the context of our own culture.
• second, that rape, while concededly a dastardly contemptuous violation of a woman's spiritual integrity, physical privacy, and psychological balance, does not involve the taking of life.
• Phil. SC: we disagree with the court's predicate that the gauge of whether or not a crime warrants the death penalty or not, is the attendance of the circumstance of death on the part of the victim.  Such a premise is in fact an ennobling of the biblical notion of retributive justice of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth".

•  The Revised Penal Code, as it was originally promulgated, provided for the death penalty in specified crimes under specific circumstances.  As early as 1886, though, capital punishment had entered our legal system through the old Penal Code, which was a modified version of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870.
• Under the Revised Penal Code, death is the penalty for the crimes of treason, correspondence with the enemy during times of war, qualified piracy, parricide, murder, infanticide, kidnapping, rape with homicide or with the use of deadly weapon or by two or more persons resulting in insanity, robbery with homicide, and arson resulting in death.
• The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of a constitutional question of whether or not the death penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment in violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual punishment
• Harden v. Director of Prison- "The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive.  In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the United States Supreme Court said that 'punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution.  It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life.
• People v. Limaco- "x x x there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the supreme penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective.  However, as long as that penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their private opinions,"

• Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that congress, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, may re-impose the death penalty.  Nothing in the said provision imposes a requirement that for a death penalty bill to be valid, a positive manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime should first be perceived and statistically proven following the suspension of the death penalty.  Neither does the said provision require that the death penalty be resorted to as a last recourse when all other criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in society
• what R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the Congress, in the interest of justice, public order and rule of law, and the need to rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to impose the death penalty for said crimes.
• Heinous crime is an act or series of acts which, by the flagrantly violent manner in which the same was committed or by the reason of its inherent viciousness, shows a patent disregard and mockery of the law, public peace and order, or public morals.  It is an offense whose essential and inherent viciousness and atrocity are repugnant and outrageous to a civilized society and hence, shock the moral self of a people.
• The right of a person is not only to live but to live a quality life, and this means that the rest of society is obligated to respect his or her individual personality, the integrity and the sanctity of his or her own physical body, and the value he or she puts in his or her own spiritual, psychological, material and social preferences and needs. 
• Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention where the victim is detained for more than three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.
• SC: the death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes because:
• the perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably execrable acts that have so deeply dehumanized a person or criminal acts with severely destructive effects on the national efforts to lift the masses from abject poverty through organized governmental strategies based on a disciplined and honest citizenry
• they have so caused irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim and the society and a repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to the safety of individuals and the survival of government, they must be permanently prevented from doing so
• People v. Cristobal:  "Rape is the forcible violation of the sexual intimacy of another person. It does injury to justice and charity.  Rape deeply wounds the respect, freedom, and physical and moral integrity to which every person has a right.  It causes grave damage that can mark the victim for life. It is always an intrinsically evil act xxx an outrage upon decency and dignity that hurts not only the victim but the society itself.
• 
  

People v. De La Cruz (Crim1)

People of the Philippines v. Pablo De La Cruz
People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Pablo De La Cruz, Defendant Appellant

En Banc
Doctrine: Neither excessive fines nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
Keywords: excessive fines
Date: April 17, 1953
Ponente: Justice Bengzon

Facts: 

• In the morning of October 14, 1950, Eduardo Bernardo, Jr. went to the De La Cruz's store in Sampaloc, Manila, and purchased from him a six-ounce tin of "Carnation" milk for thirty centavos. 
• As the purchase had been made for Ruperto Austria, who was not in good terms with Pablo de la Cruz the matter reached the City Fiscal's office and resulted in this criminal prosecution, because Executive Order No. 331 (issued by authority of Republic Act No. 509) fixed 20 centavos as the maximum price for that kind of commodity.
• Republic Act No. 509 provides in part as follows:
• SEC. 12. Imprisonment for a period of not less two months nor more than twelve years or a fine of not less than two thousand pesos nor more than ten thousand pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who sells any article, goods, or commodity in excess of the maximum selling price fixed by the president; . . . .
• In addition to the penalties prescribed above, the persons, corporations, partnerships, or associations found guilty of any violation of this Act or of any rule or regulations issued by the president pursuant to this Act shall be barred from the wholesome and retail business for a period of five years for a first offense, and shall be permanently barred for the second or succeeding offenses.
• Having retailed a can of milk at ten centavos more than the ceiling price, Pablo de la Cruz was sentenced, after trial, in the court of first instance of Manila, to imprisonment for five years, and to pay a fine of five thousand pesos plus costs. He was also barred from engaging in wholesale and retail business for five years.

Issue/s:

1. WON the trial judge erred in imposing a punishment wholly disproportionate to the offence
2. WON the trial judge erred in not invalidating RA No. 509 in so far as it prescribed excessive penalties.
1. Is imprisonment for two months or fine of two thousand pesos too excessive for a merchant who sells goods at prices beyond the ceilings established in the Executive Order?
2. Is five years and five thousand pesos, cruel and unusual for a violation that merely netted a ten-centavo profit to the accused?

Held: We may decrease the penalty, exercising that discretion vested in the courts by the same statutory enactment. Wherefore, reducing the imprisonment to six months and the fine to two thousand pesos, we hereby affirm the appealed decision in all other respects.


Ratio:

• The constitution directs that "Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."
•  The prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and apply to punishment which never existed in America of which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete (15 Am. Jur., p. 172), for instance those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like (15 Am. Jur., supra, Note 35 L.R.A. p. 561). 
• Fine and imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition.
• However, there are respectable authorities holding that the inhibition applies as well to punishments that although not cruel and unusual in nature, may be so severe as to fall within the fundamental restriction. (15 Am. Jur., p. 178)
• For the purposes of this decision, we may assume, without actually holding, that too long a prison term might clash with the Philippine Constitution. But that brings up again two opposing theories
• we are told the prohibition applies to legislation only, and not to the courts' decision imposing penalties within the limits of the statute (15 Am. Jur., "Criminal Law" sec. 526). 
• the section would violate the Constitution, if the penalty is excessive under any and all circumstances, the minimum being entirely out of proportion to the kind of offenses prescribed
• Is imprisonment for two months or fine of two thousand pesos too excessive for a merchant who sells goods at prices beyond the ceilings established in the Executive Order?
• NO. because in overstepping the price barriers Dela Cruz might derive, in some instances, profits amounting to thousands of pesos
• The prison term must be so disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of all reasonable men as to what is right and proper under the circumstances (lb.). 
• authorities are not lacking to the effect that the fundamental prohibition likewise restricts the judge's power and authority
• The second theory would contrast the penalty imposed by the court with the gravity of the particular crime or misdemeanor, and if notable disparity results, it would apply the constitutional brake, even if the statute would, under other circumstances, be not extreme or oppressive.
• Is five years and five thousand pesos, cruel and unusual for a violation that merely netted a ten-centavo profit to the accused?
• NO.
• In our opinion the damage caused to the State is not measured exclusively by the gains obtained by the accused, inasmuch as one violation would mean others, and the consequential breakdown of the beneficial system of price controls.

People of the Philippines v. Carlos (CRIM1)

Note: didn't include all arguments of Carlos. Only included the one abt equal protection.


People of the Philippines v. Carlos
People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Apolonio Carlos, Defendant Appellant

En Banc

Doctrine: Due process & equal protection

Keywords: Equal Protection

Date: June 30, 1947

Ponente: Justice Tuason

Facts: 

• The appellant was found guilty of treason by the People's Court and sentenced to reclusion perpetua, to pay a fine of P7,000, and costs.
• background lang on why: The lower court found that one day in July or August, 1944, about two or three o'clock in the morning, a truck pulled up to the curb in front of a house on Constancia Street, Sampaloc, Manila, where one Martin Mateo lived. From the truck the accused, a Japanese spy, alighted together with members of the Japanese military police and pointed Martin Mateo's house and Fermin Javier's house to his Japanese companions, whereupon the Japanese soldiers broke into Martin Mateo's dwelling first and Fermin Javier's afterwards. In those houses they seized Martin Mateo, Ladislao Mateo and Fermin Javier, bound their hands, and put them in the truck. Along with other persons who had been rounded up in the other places and who had been kept in the truck while it was parked, they were taken to Fort Santiago where the two Mateos and Fermin Javier were tortured and from which they were released six days later. The reason for the arrest and maltreatment of Martin and Ladislao Mateo was that they had refused to divulge the whereabouts of their brother, Marcelino Mateo, who was a guerrilla and who had escaped from the Japanese. And Fermin Javier was arrested and tortured because he himself was a guerrilla, a fact which Carlos knew or at least suspected.
• Carlos alleged that the law creating the People's Court is unconstitutional; that numerous provisions of the People's Court Act are singled out as contrary to the Organic Law

Issue: WON the People's Court Act (PCA) is unconstitutional.

Held: No. The judgment of the lower court is affirmed with costs against appellant.

Ratio:

• Carlos argued that The PCA contained
• provisions which deal on matters entirely foreign to the subject matter expressed in its 
• title, such as: 
• (1) a provision which retains the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance;
• (2) a provision which adds to the disqualification of Justices of the Supreme Court 
• and provides a procedure for their substitution; 
• (3) a provision which changed the 
• existing Rules of Court on the subject of bail, and 
• (4) a provision which suspends 
• Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Municipality of Binalonan: The People's Court was intended to be a full and complete scheme with its own machinery for the indictment, trial and judgment of treason case. The various provisos mentioned, in our opinion, are allied and germane to the subject matter and purposes of the People's Court Act; they are subordinate to its end. The multitude of matters which the legislation, by its nature, has to embrace would make mention of all of them in the title of the act cumbersome. It is not necessary, and the Congress is not expected, to make the title of an enactment a complete index of its contents.
• SC: The constitutional rule is satisfied if all parts of a law relate to the subject expressed in its title.
• Carlos also argued that PCA deprives persons similarly situated of the equal protection of the laws inasmuch as:
• (1) Only those political offenders against whom cases are filed within six months from the passage of the law are to be tried in the People's Court, while others are to be tried in the Courts of First Instance;
• SC: The People's Court is a court of special and restricted jurisdiction created under the stress of an emergency and national security. It was devised to operate for a limited period only, a limitation imposed by economic necessity and other factors of public policy. Obviously, the main concerning the creation of a special court was the trial and and disposition of the cases, numbering over 6,000, of accused who were being held by the United States military authorities and who were to be turned over to the Commonwealth Government.
• (2) Political offenders accused in the People's Court are denied preliminary examination and/or investigation whereas the others who shall be entitled thereto;
• SC:  Section 22 in denying preliminary investigation to persons accused before the People's Court is justified by the conditions prevailing when the law was enacted. In view of the great number of prisoners then under detention and the length of time and amount of labor that would be consumed if so many prisoners were allowed the right to have preliminary investigation, considered with the necessity of disposing of these cases at the earliest possible dates in the interest of the public and of the accused themselves, it was not an unwise measure which dispensed with such investigation in such cases. Preliminary investigation, it must be remembered, is not a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution.
• (3) Political offenders accused in the People's Court have limited right to appeal, while those who may be accused of the same crimes in the Courts of First Instance have absolute right of appeal inasmuch as under section 13 of the law, Rules 42 and 46 of the Rules of Court are made applicable to the latter;
• SC: The People's Court is a collegiate court whereas the Court of First Instance is presided over by a single judge. Appeal is not a constitutional but statutory right. The admitted fact that there is no discrimination among appeals from the same court or class of court saves the provision objected to from being unconstitutional
• (4) Appeals in the case involving persons who held any office or position under either or both the Philippine Executive Commission and the Philippine Republic or any branch, instrumentality and/or agency thereof are to heard and decided by a substantially different Supreme Court, thus causing lack of informity in rulings over the same subject;
• SC: This objection does not seem to fall within the subject of constitutional guarantee against deprivation of equal protection of the laws. Be that as it may, we find no merit in the appellant's contention. 
• SC: The disqualification under the People's Court Act of some or a majority of the members of this Court and their substitution by justices of the Court of Appeals or judges of the Courts of First Instance do not make the Supreme Court, as thus constituted, a new court in the eyes of the law. 
• SC: A court is an entity possessing a personality separate and distinct from the men who compose or sit on it. This objection is no more valid than that of a party in an ordinary action who protests that his case is heard by a Supreme Court which, by reason of disability of a majority of its regular members, is made up mostly of judges from outside. 
• SC: As to the "lack of uniformity in rulings over the same subject," it need only be said that the Constitution does not insure uniformity of judicial decisions; neither does it assure immunity from judicial error.
• (5) The first proviso of section 19 thereof prescribes a different rule as to the granting of release on bail only with respect to the political offenders detained by the United States Army and released to the Commonwealth of the Philippines but not as to others political offenders accused or accusable of the same crimes; and
• (6) The second proviso of section 19 thereof suspends article 125 of the Revised Penal Code only as to those political detainees released by the United States Army to the Commonwealth of the Philippines or, at most, only to those accused or accusable of the crimes specified in the law and not as to all persons accused or accusable of crimes against national security committed during the second world war, much less to all offenders, notwithstanding the fact that there is no reasonable and real difference among said groups of offenders.
• SC: (5) and (6) The two provisos in section 19 do no constitute denial of equal protection of the laws. The distinction made by these provisos between two sets of accused in the "granting or release on bail" and in the application of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code are not arbitrary or fanciful calculated to favor or prejudice one or the other class.
• Laurel vs. Misa (76 Phil., 372): this Court explained the reasons which necessitated the extension to six months of the authorized detention of persons charged with treason before filing of information. The provisos rest "on some real and substantial difference or distinction bearing a just and fair relation to the legislation."
• Carlos argued that (c) It is a bill of attainder in that it virtually imposes upon specific, known and identified individuals or group of individual, the penalty of detention and imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months without any form of judicial trial or procedure
• Cummings vs. Missouri: The bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial."
• SC: Detention of a prisoner for a period not exceeding six months pending investigation or trial is not a punishment but a necessary extension of the well-recognized power to hold the criminal suspected for investigation

Adiong v. COMELEC (CRIM1)

ADIONG vs. COMELEC

Blo Umpar Adiong, plaintiff v. Commission on elections, defendants

En Banc

Doctrine: Due process & equal protection

Keywords: void for overbreadth

Date: March 31, 1992

Ponente: Justice Gutierrez Jr.

Facts:

·         On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its powers granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws.

·         Section 15(a) of the resolution provides:

o    Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. — The following are lawful election propaganda:

(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals… Provided, That decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof.

·         Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:

Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda. —

It is unlawful:…

(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or billboards…

·         Petitioner Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections assails the COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646.

Issue: WON the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes.

Held: Petition is GRANTED. The portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution No. 2347 of the Commission on Elections providing that "decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof" is DECLARED NULL and VOID.

Ratio:

·         The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction involved in this case.

o    Thomas v. Collins: All of the protections expressed in the Bill of Rights are important but we have accorded to free speech the status of a preferred freedom

o    Mutuc v. COMELEC: the preferred freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage

o    It is difficult to imagine how the other provisions of the Bill of Rights and the right to free elections may be guaranteed if the freedom to speak and to convince or persuade is denied and taken away.

o    Too many restrictions will deny to people the robust, uninhibited, and wide open debate, the generating of interest essential if our elections will truly be free, clean and honest.

o    For persons who have to resort to judicial action to strike down requirements which they deem inequitable or oppressive, a court case may prove to be a hollow remedy. The judicial process, by its very nature, requires time for rebuttal, analysis and reflection. We cannot act instantly on knee-jerk impulse. By the time we revoke an unallowably restrictive regulation or ruling, time which is of the essence to a candidate may have lapsed and irredeemable opportunities may have been lost.

o    When faced with border line situations where freedom to speak by a candidate or party and freedom to know on the part of the electorate are invoked against actions intended for maintaining clean and free elections, the police, local officials and COMELEC, should lean in favor of freedom.

o    National Press Club v. COMELEC : A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government, if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest

o    The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does not endanger any substantial government interest

·  The questioned prohibition premised on the statute and as couched in the resolution is void for overbreadth.

o    Zwickler v. Koota(19 L ed 2d 444 [1967]) : A statute is considered void for overbreadth when "it offends the constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."

o    In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.

§  Holden v. Hardy: Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns. It is elementary that it includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of it. The Constitution protects these essential attributes of property.

§  We have to consider the fact that in the posting of decals and stickers on cars and other moving vehicles, the candidate needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. In such a case, the prohibition would not only deprive the owner who consents to such posting of the decals and stickers the use of his property but more important, in the process, it would deprive the citizen of his right to free speech and information

·         The constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII, section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles. It is to be reiterated that the posting of decals and stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen becomes crucial in this kind of election propaganda not the financial resources of the candidate.

·         In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution

Harden vs. Director of Prisons (Crim1)

Harden vs. Director of Prisons (81 Phil. 741)

Facts:

On July 12, 1941 Fred M. Harden was involved in a civil case with Mrs. Harden concerning conjugal partnership, payment of alimony and accounting. A preliminary injunction was issued restraining Mr. Harden from transferring or alienating, except with consideration and consent of the court, all assets (money, shares of stock, property, real, personal, whether in his name, her name or both) in the partnership with Mrs. Harden. During 1946 however, Mr. Harden transferred drafts and cash in overseas accounts. In the course of two years, he received orders from the SC to return the amounts but Mr. Harden kept filing for extensions. On March 24, 1948, he was committed to jail because of contempt (failure to comply with the court’s orders of producing the amounts) and held there until he can produce said amounts.

Issue:

Relevant: WoN the imprisonment sentence for Mr. Harden is excessive punishment.

Irrelevant: WoN the property moved into foreign jurisdiction is still covered by Philippine jurisdiction

Held and Ratio:

Relevant: No. Mr. Harden has “the keys to his prison” and his detainment is something that he himself can end at any time. (Sec. 7, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court: When the contempt consists in the omission to do an act which is yet in the power of the accused to perform, he may be imprisoned by order of a superior court until he performs it)

Irrelevant: Yes. “While a court cannot give its receiver authority to act in another state without the assistance of the courts thereof (53 C. J., 390-391) yet it may act directly upon the parties before it with respect to the property beyond the limits of its territorial jurisdiction, and hold them in contempt if they resist the court’s orders with reference to its custody or disposition.”

Decision: Petition is denied.

Separate Opinion: Perfecto, J.

He believes that it is indeed an excessive penalty because of Mr. Harden’s claims that it is beyond his power to comply with the court order and would thus result in life imprisonment for Mr. Harden. 

People vs. Ferrer (Crim1)

People vs. Ferrer (48 SCRA 382)

Facts:

On March 10, 1970, a prima facie case was filed against Feliciano Co in the Court of First Instance in Tarlac concerning the Anti-Subversion Act. He was accused of being an officer or a ranked leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to overthrow the government of the Philippines by means of force, violence, deceit, subversion or any other illegal means. Co claimed that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder. On May 25, 1970, Nilo Tayag and five others were also charged in the same court with subversion. Tayag copied Co’s attack on the law. The court ruled the statute void on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder and that it is vague overbroad. Government appealed to the SC as a special civil action for certiorari.

Issues:

Relevant: WoN the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder

Irrelevant: WoN it is vague and overbroad

Irrelevant: WoN it denies the defendants the due process of the law

Held And Ratio:

Relevant: No. Only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder. (US v. Lovett 328 US 303 1946)

Irrelevant: No. The contention about the word “overthrow” regarding the government (peaceful overthrowing) is clarified by the provision of the clause: by means of force, violence, deceit, subversion or any other illegal means.

Irrelevant: No. The freedom of expression and freedom of association is superseded by the right of the state to self-preservation.

Decision: The questioned resolution is set aside.

US vs. Diaz-Conde (Crim1)

US vs. Diaz-Conde (42 Phil 766)

Facts:

On December 30, 1915, complainants Bartolome Oliveros and Engracia Lianco entered into a contract with the defendants concerning a debt of P300. Oliveros and co. were obligated to pay five percent interest per month within the first ten days of every month. On May 6, 1921, Vicente Diaz Conde and Apolinaria R. De Conde were charged with violating the Usury Law in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila. They were found guilty, sentenced to pay a fine of P120 and in case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of law. They took it to SC to plead.

Issues:

WoN the Usury Law has a retroactive effect in this case

WoN the law impaired the contract

Held and Ratio:

No. The Usury Law, a penal law, cannot become retroactive unless it is favorable to the person accused. (Art. 21 and 22 Penal Code)

Yes. If a contract is legal at its inception, it cannot be rendered illegal by any subsequent legislation.

Decision: Judgment reversed, defendants acquitted.

People vs. Formigones (Crim1)

People vs. Formigones (87 Phil. 658)

Facts:

On December 28, 1946, Abelardo Formigones caused his wife, Julia Agricola, lethal injury with a bolo. Having done so, he then carried his wife to the living room and lay down beside her. This was how he was found by the people summoned by his eldest daughter, who witnessed the stabbing. He pleaded guilty to the Court of the First Instance in Camarines Sur citing jealousy as his motive for he believed his wife was being intimate with his brother. He received the sentence of reclusion perpetua and the Solicitor General filed for an appeal on the grounds that he is an imbecile.

Issues:

WoN the defendant is an imbecile

WoN the questioned imbecilic nature of the defendant can affect his punishment.

Held and Ratio:

No, the defendant is not an imbecile, evidenced by his previous sixteen years of sanity in his marriage. Though he has procured the sympathies of the court with the circumstances of his situation.

No, the defendant is still charged with reclusion perpetua. The two mitigating circumstances, his diminished will power and his act of passion driven by jealousy (Art. 13 of Revised Penal Code) has been considered by the court but he is credited with one-half of any preventive imprisonment he has undergone.

Decision: Judgment affirmed but this case should be brought to the attention of the Chief Executive who, in his discretion may reduce the penalty to that next lower to reclusion perpetua to death or otherwise apply executive clemency in the manner he sees fit.

Padilla vs. Dizon (Crim1)

Alexander Padilla, complainant, vs. The Hon. Baltazar R. Dizon, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 113, respondent.

February 23, 1988

Per Curiam

Facts:

• Respondent Baltazar R. Dizon acquitted, in his decision, the tourist and accused, Lo Chi Fai, saying that Lo Chi Fai had no willful intention to violate the law. He also directed the release to Lo Chi Fai of at least the amount of US$3,000.00 under Central Bank Circular No. 960.
• Lo Chi Fai was caught by Customs guard at the Manila International Airport while attempting to smuggle foreign currency and foreign exchange instruments out of the country.
• An information was filed against Lo Chi Fai with the RTC for violation of Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular No. 960 with a penal sanction provided by Sec. 1, PD NO. 1883.
• Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular No. 960 provides that no person shall take out or transmit or attempt to take out or transmit foreign exchange in any form out of the Philippines without an authorization by the Central Bank. Tourists and non-resident visitors may take out or send out from the Philippine foreign exchange in amounts not exceeding such amounts of foreign exchange brought in by them. Tourists and non-resident temporary visitors bringing with them more than US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other foreign currencies shall declare their foreign exchange in the form prescribed by the Central Bank at points of entries upon arrival in the Philippines.
• Sec. 1, P.D. No. 1883 provides that any person who shall engage in the trading or purchase and sale of foreign currency in violation of existing laws or rules and regulations of the Central Bank shall be guilty of the crime of blackmarketing of foreign exchange and shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal (minimum of 12 years and 1 day and maximum of 20 years) and a fine of no less than P50,000.00.
• At the trial, Lo Chi Fai tried to establish that he was a businessman from Hongkong, that he had come to the Philippines 9 to 10 times to invest in business in the country with his business associates, and that he and his business associates declared all the money they brought in and all declarations were handed to and kept by him.
• Because of the revolution taking place in Manila during that time, Lo Chi Fai was urged by his business associates to come to Manila to bring the money out of the Philippines.
• Commissioner of Customs, Alexander Padilla, then filed a complaint against Baltazar R. Dizon for acquitting Lo Chi Fai.

Issue:

• Whether or not respondent Baltazar R. Dizon is guilty of gross incompetence or gross ignorance of the law in holding that the accused, Lo Chi Fai, for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960, the prosecution must establish that the accused had the criminal intent to violate the law.

Held:

• Yes.

Ratio:

• Baltazar R. Dizon ignored the fact that the foreign currency and foreign currency instruments found in the possession of Lo Chi Fai when he was apprehended at the airport and the amounts of such foreign exchange did not correspond to the foreign currency declarations presented by Lo Chi Fai at the trial, and that these currency declarations were declarations belonging to other people. 
• In invoking the provisions of the Central Bank Circular No. 960 to justify the release of US$3,000.00 to Lo Chi Fai, Baltazar R. Dizon again diplayed gross incompetence and gross ignorance of law. There is nothing in the Central Bank Circular which could be taken as authority for the trial court to release the said amount of US Currency to Lo Chi Fai.

US vs. Ah Chong (Crim1)

The United States, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Ah Chong, defendant-appellant.


En Banc


Carson, March 19, 1910


Topic: Mental element (Mens rea) - Deliberate intent (Dolo) - Mistake of fact


Facts:

• The defendant Ah Chong was a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort McKinley, Rizal Province
• Pascual Gualberto, deceased, works at the same place as a house boy or muchacho
• "Officers' quarters, No. 27" was a detached house some 40 meters from the nearest building
• No one slept in the house except the two servants who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of the building
• This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height
• The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock; the occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair
• On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10:00 pm, the defendant was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room
• He called out twice,  "Who is there?"
• He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room
• The defendant warned the intruder "If you enter the room, I will kill you."
• Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder (when he entered the room) who turned out to be his roommate Pascual
• Pascual ran out upon the porch heavily wounded
• Recognizing Pascual, the defendant called to his employers who slept in the next house and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds
• Pascual died from the effects of the wound the following day
• The roommates appear to have been in friendly and amicable terms prior to the incident, and had an understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock that the door and acquaint his companion with his identity
• The defendant alleges that he kept the knife under his pillow as personal protection because of repeated robberies in Fort McKinley
• Defendant admitted to stabbing his roommate, but said that he did it under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron (thief)" because he forced open the door of their sleeping room, despite the defendant's warnings
• Defendant was found guilty by the trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating (mitigating) circumstances, and sentenced to 6 years and 1 day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by law

Issue:

• Whether or not the defendant can be held criminally responsible

Holding:

• No.

Ratio:

• By reason of a mistake as to the facts, the defendant did an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be (i.e. if Pascual was actually a thief, he will not be criminally liable/responsible because it would be self-defense), but would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts (i.e. if he knew that it was actually Pascual, he would be guilty of homicide/assassination)
• The defendant's ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith
• "The act itself foes not make man guilty unless his intention were so"
• The essence of the offense is the wrongful intent, without which it cannot exist
• "The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him."
• If one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts which will justify a killing, if without fault or carelessness he does believe them, he is legally guiltless of the homicide
• The defendant was doing no more than exercise his legitimate right of self-defense
• He cannot be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts

RTC's decision is reversed. The defendant is acquitted.

People vs. Puno (Crim1)

People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Isabelo Puno y Guevarra, alias "Beloy," and Enrique Amurao y Puno, alias "Enry," accused-appellants


En Banc


Regalado, February 17, 1993


Topic: Mental Element (Mens rea) -- Deliberate intent (Dolo) -- General and specific intent


Facts:

• January 13, 1988 in QC, at around 5:00 pm: the accused Isabelo Puno, who is the personal driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who was then away in Davao purportedly on account of local election there) arrived at Mrs. Sarmiento's bakeshop in Araneta Ave, QC
• He told Mrs. Sarmiento that her own driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on an emergency so Isabelo will temporarily take his place
• When it was time for Mrs. Sarmiento to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig, she got into her husband's Mercedes Benz with Isabelo driving
• After the car turned right on a corner of Araneta Ave, it stopped and a young man, accused Enrique Amurao, boarded the car beside the driver
• Enrique pointed a gun at Mrs. Sarmiento as Isabelo told her that he needs to "get money" from her
• Mrs. Sarmiento had P7,000 on her bag which she handed to the accused
• But the accused said that they wanted P100,000 more
• The car sped off north towards the North superhighway where Isabelo asked Mrs. Sarmiento to issue a check for P100,000
• Mrs. Sarmiento drafted 3 checks: two P30,000 checks and one P40,000 check
• Isabelo then turned the car around towards Metro Manila; later, he changed his mind and turned the car again towards Pampanga
• According to her, Mrs. Sarmiento jumped out of the car then, crossed to the other side of the superhighway and was able to flag down a fish vendor's van, her dress had blood because according to her, she fell down on the ground and was injured when she jumped out of the car
• The defense does not dispute the above narrative of the complainant except that according to Isabelo, he stopped the car at North Diversion and freely allowed Mrs. Sarmiento to step out of the car
• He said he even slowed the car down as he drove away, until he saw that his employer had gotten a ride
• He claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while running across the highway

Issue:

1. Whether or not the accused can be convicted of kidnapping for ransom as charged
2. Whether or not the said robbery can be classified as "highway robbery" under PD No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974)

Holding:

1. No.
2. No.

Ratio:

1. There is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to or at the time they committed the wrongful acts against complainant, other than the extortion of money from her under the compulsion of threats or intimidation.
• For this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her liberty
• In the case, the restraint of her freedom of action was merely an incident in the commission of another offense primarily intended by the offenders
• This does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal detention
2. Jurisprudence reveals that during the early part of the American occupation of our country, roving bands were organized for robbery and pillage and since the then existing law against robbery was inadequate to cope with such moving bands of outlaws, the Brigandage Law was passed (this is the origin of the law on highway robbery)
• PD No. 532 punishes as highway robbery only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine highways and not acts of robbery committed against only a predetermined or particular victim
• The mere fact that the robbery was committed inside a car which was casually operating on a highway does not make PD No 532 applicable to the case
• This is not justified by the accused's intention

Accused-appellants convicted of robbery (indeterminate sentence of 4 years and 2 months or prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor. Accused to pay Mrs. Sarmiento P7,000 as actual damages and P20,000 as moral damages.)

People vs. Talingdan (Crim1)

The People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras, Pedro Bides and Teresa Domogma, accused-appellants


En Banc


Per Curiam, July 6, 1978


Topic: Elements of criminal liability (Art. 3) -- Physical element -- Act/Omission


Facts:

• Teresa Domogma was the supposed wife of the deceased Bernardo Bagabag
• No certificate or any other proof of their marriage could be presented by the prosecution
• They lived with their children in Sobosob, Salapadan, Abra
• Their relationship had been strained and beset with troubles for Teresa had deserted her family home a couple of times and each time Bernardo took time out to look for her
• On 2 different occasions, appellant Nemesis Talingdan has visited Teresa in their house while Bernardo was out at work, and during those visits Teresa had made Corazon, their then 12-year old daughter to go down the house and leave them
• Bernardo had gotten wind that an illicit relationship was going on between Talingdan and Teresa
• About a month before Bernardo was killed, Teresa had again left their house and did not come back for a period of more than 3 weeks, and Bernardo came to know later that she and Talingdan were seen together in the town of Tayum Abra during that time
• Just two days before Bernardo was killed (Thursday), Bernardo and Theresa had a violent quarrel; Bernardo slapped Theresa several times, resulting in Theresa seeking the help of the police
• Accused Talingdan, a policeman, came armed to the vicinity of Bernardo's house and called him to come down; Bernardo ignored him; Talingdan instead left and warned Bernardo that someday he would kill him
• On Saturday, June 24, 1967, Bernardo was gunned down in his house
• The defendants' and Corazon's accounts of what happened had variations

Corazon's version:

• Friday morning: Corazon was in a creek to wash clothes. She saw her mother Teresa meeting with Talingdan and their co-appellants Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras, and Pedro Bides in a small hut owned by Bernardo
• She heard one of them say "Could he elude a bullet"
• When Teresa noticed Corazon, she shoved her away saying "You tell your father that we will kill him"
• Saturday, after sunset: Corazon was cooking food for supper when she saw her mother go down the house to go to the yard where she again met with the other appellants.
• She noted the long guns the appellants were carrying.
• Teresa came back to the house and proceeded to her room.
• Corazon informed Bernardo, who was then working on a plow, about the presence of persons downstairs, but Bernardo paid no attention
• Bernardo proceeded to the kitchen and sat himself on the floor near the door
• He was suddenly fired upon form below the stairs of the batalan
• The four accused climbed the stairs of the batalan and upon seeing that Bernardo was still alive, Talingdan and Tobias fired at him again
• Bides and Berras did not fire at that precise time but when Corazon tried to call for helo, Bides warned her that he will kill her if she calls for help
• Teresa came out of her room and when Corazon informed her that she recognized the killers, the former threatened to kill the latter if she reveals the matter to anyone

The defendants'' version:

• Teresa loved Bernardo dearly, they never quarreled, and her husband never maltreated her.
• Teresa came to know Talingdan only when the latter became a policeman in Sallapadan; an illicit relationship never existed between them
• Talingdan was not in Sallapadan at the time of the killing on June 24; he escorted the Mayor in Bangued from June 22 to June 26
• Tobias, Bides, and Berras claimed to be in the house of one Mrs. Bayongan in Sallapadan, 250-300 meters from the place of the killing

Issue:

• Whether or not Teresa Domogma is an accessory to Bernardo's murder
• It is contended that there is no evidence proving that she actually joined in the conspuracy to kill her husband because there is no showing of actual cooperation on her part with co-appellants in their culpable acts that led to his death
• It is claimed that what is apparent is "mere cognizance, acquiescence or approval thereof on her part, which it is argued is less than what is required for her conviction as a conspirator

Holding:

• Yes. She is an accessory to Bernardo's murder.

Ratio:

• Note: The court believed Corazon's testimony.
• It is true that proof of her direct participation in the conspiracy is not beyond reasonable doubt; she cannot have the same liability as her co-appellants. She had no hand in the actual shooting. It is also not clear if she helped directly in the planning and preparation thereof. But the court is convinced that she knew it was going to be done and did not object.
• There is in the record morally convincing proof that she is at the very least an accessory to the offense committed.
• She did not only order her daughter not to reveal what she knew to anyone, she also claimed to have no suspects in mind when the peace officers came into their house later to investigate
• Whereas before the actual shooting she was more or less passive in her attitude regarding the conspiracy, after Bernardo was killed, she became active in her cooperation with her co-appellants
• These acts constitute "concealing or assisting in the escape of the principal in the crime"

Male appellants sentenced to death. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt is Teresa Domogma, sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 5 years of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years of prision mayor as maximum.

People v. Rosenthal & Osmena (Crim1)

People v. Rosenthal & Osmena

People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee v. Jacob Rosenthal & Nicasio Osmena, defendants-appellants

En Banc

Doctrine: Due process & equal protection

Keywords: void of vagueness, equal protection, undue delegation of legislative authority

Date: June 12, 1939      

Ponente: Justice Laurel

Facts:

·   Jacob Rosenthal and Nicasio Osmeña were founders and shareholders of the O.R.O. Oil Company. The main objects and purposes of the company are to mine, refine, market, buy and sell petroleum, natural gas and other oil products.

·   Rosenthal and Osmeña were found guilty by the RTC in two cases of selling their shares to individuals without first obtaining the corresponding written permit or license from the Insular Treasurer of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.

·   This is in violation of Sections 2 & 5 of Act No. 2581, commonly known as the Blue Sky Law.

o    Section 2 of said law provides that every person, partnership, association, or corporation attempting to offer to sell in the Philippines speculative securities of any kind or character whatsoever, is under obligation to file previously with the Insular Treasurer the various documents and papers enumerated therein and to pay the required tax of twenty-pesos.

o    Sec 5, on the other hand, provides that “whatever the said Treasurer of the Philippine Islands is satisfied, either with or without the examination herein provided, that any person, partnership, association or corporation is entitled to the right to offer its securities as above defined and provided for sale in the Philippine Islands, he shall issue to such person, partnership, association or corporation a certificate or permit reciting that such person, partnership, association or corporation has complied with the provisions of this act, and that such person, partnership, association or corporation, its brokers or agents are entitled to order the securities named in said certificate or permit for sale”; that “said Treasurer shall furthermore have authority, whenever in his judgment it is in the public interest, to cancel said certificate or permit”, and that “an appeal from the decision of the Insular Treasurer may be had within the period of thirty days to the Secretary of Finance.”

·   The shares are said to be speculative because their value materially depended upon a promise of future promotion and development of the oil business, rather than on actual tangible assets.

·   On appeal, Rosenthal & Osmena argued that Act 2581 is unconstitutional on three grounds:

o    1) That it constitutes undue delegation of legislative authority to the Insular treasurer

o    2) that it does not afford equal protection before the law

o    3) that it is vague and ambiguous

Issue: WON the law is unconstitutional in any of the three grounds

Held: The law is CONSTITUTIONAL on all grounds alleged by the appellants.

Ratio:

·         That it constitutes undue delegation of legislative authority to the Insular treasurer

• The Act furnishes a sufficient standard for the Treasurer to follow in reaching a decision regarding the issuance or cancellation of a certificate or permit. The certificate or permit to be issued under the Act must recite that the person ,partnership, association or corporation applying therefor “has complied with the provisions of this Act”, and this requirement, construed in relation to the other provisions of the law, means that a certificate or permit shall be issued by the Insular Treasurer when the provisions of Act 2581 have been complied with. Upon the other hand, the authority of the Insular Treasurer to cancel a certificate or permit is expressly conditioned upon a finding that such cancellation “is in the public interest.” In view of the intention and purpose of Act 2581 to protect the public against “speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of blue sky” and against the “sale of stock infly-by-night concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold mines, and other like fraudulent exploitations”, we hold that “public interest” in this case is a sufficient standard to guide the Insular Treasurer in reaching a decision on a matter pertaining to the issuance or cancellation of certificates or permits.
• Act 2581 allows appeal from the decision of the Treasurer to the Sec of Finance. Hence, it cannot be contended that the Treasurer can act and decide without any restraining influence.
• The theory of the separation of powers is designed by its originators to secure action and at the same time to forestall over action which necessarily results from undue concentration of powers, and thereby obtain efficiency and prevent despotism. Thereby, the “rule of law” was established which narrows the range of governmental action and makes it subject to control by certain legal devices. As a corollary, we find the rule prohibiting delegation of legislative authority, and from the earliest time American legal authorities have proceeded on the theory that legislative power must be exercised by the legislative alone. It is frankness, however, to confess that as one delves into the mass of judicial pronouncements, he finds a great deal of confusion.
• the maxim “delegatus non potest delegare or delegata potestas non potest delegare”  has beenmade to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of “subordinate legislation”, in practically all modern governments. Difficulty lies in fixing the limit and extent of the authority. While courts have undertaken to laydown general principles, the safest is to decide each case according to its peculiar environment, having in mind the wholesome legislative purpose intended to be achieved.
• Hall v Geiger-Jones: it is well-settled principle of law in this state that by legislative act a commission or board may be empowered to ascertain the existence of facts, upon the finding of which may depend the right to continue in the practice of a profession or a regulated business.

·         that it does not afford equal protection before the law

o    Another ground relied upon by appellants in contending that Act No. 2581 is unconstitutional is that it denies equal protection of the laws because the law discriminates between an owner who sells his securities in a single transaction and one who disposes of them in repeated and successive transactions.

o    Hall vs. Geiger-Jones Co: "Prominent among such discriminations are . . . between an owner who sells his securities in a single transaction and one who disposes of them in successive transactions; . . . " If a class is deemed to present a conspicuous example of what the legislature seeks to prevent, the 14th Amendment allows it to be dealt with although otherwise and merely logically not distinguishable from others not embraced in the law

·         that it is vague and ambiguous

o    People vs. Fernandez and Trinidad. An Act will be declared void and inoperative on the ground of vagueness and uncertainty only upon a showing that the defect is such that the courts are unable to determine, with any reasonable degree of certainty, what the legislature intended.

o    In this connection we cannot pretermit reference to the rule that “legislation should not be held invalid on the ground of uncertainty if susceptible of any reasonable construction that will support and give it effect. An Act will not be declared inoperative and ineffectual on the ground that it furnishes no adequate means to secure the purpose for which it is passed, if men of common sense and reason can devise and provide the means, and all the instrumentalities necessary for its execution are within the reach of those intrusted therewith.”

Judgement of lower court is affirmed, with modifications that the fines are reduced.

            Rosenthal: from P500 -> P200 in each case

            Osmena: from P1000 -> P500, from P2000 -> P1000

            Subsidiary imprisonment for both in case of insolvency, and costs.

Note: sinama ko na lang din yung isa pang issue. Hahaha. Pero ung equal protection & vagueness ung main na kailangan for crim I think. <3, Nina