Sunday, June 24, 2012

Adiong v. COMELEC (CRIM1)


ADIONG vs. COMELEC
Blo Umpar Adiong, plaintiff v. Commission on elections, defendants
En Banc
Doctrine: Due process & equal protection
Keywords: void for overbreadth
Date: March 31, 1992
Ponente: Justice Gutierrez Jr.

Facts:
·         On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its powers granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws.

·         Section 15(a) of the resolution provides:

o    Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. — The following are lawful election propaganda:

(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals… Provided, That decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof.

·         Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:
Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda. —

It is unlawful:…

(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or billboards…

·         Petitioner Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections assails the COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646.


Issue: WON the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes.

Held: Petition is GRANTED. The portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution No. 2347 of the Commission on Elections providing that "decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof" is DECLARED NULL and VOID.

Ratio:

·         The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction involved in this case.
o    Thomas v. Collins: All of the protections expressed in the Bill of Rights are important but we have accorded to free speech the status of a preferred freedom
o    Mutuc v. COMELEC: the preferred freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage
o    It is difficult to imagine how the other provisions of the Bill of Rights and the right to free elections may be guaranteed if the freedom to speak and to convince or persuade is denied and taken away.
o    Too many restrictions will deny to people the robust, uninhibited, and wide open debate, the generating of interest essential if our elections will truly be free, clean and honest.
o    For persons who have to resort to judicial action to strike down requirements which they deem inequitable or oppressive, a court case may prove to be a hollow remedy. The judicial process, by its very nature, requires time for rebuttal, analysis and reflection. We cannot act instantly on knee-jerk impulse. By the time we revoke an unallowably restrictive regulation or ruling, time which is of the essence to a candidate may have lapsed and irredeemable opportunities may have been lost.
o    When faced with border line situations where freedom to speak by a candidate or party and freedom to know on the part of the electorate are invoked against actions intended for maintaining clean and free elections, the police, local officials and COMELEC, should lean in favor of freedom.
o    National Press Club v. COMELEC : A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government, if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest
o    The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does not endanger any substantial government interest

·  The questioned prohibition premised on the statute and as couched in the resolution is void for overbreadth.
o    Zwickler v. Koota(19 L ed 2d 444 [1967]) : A statute is considered void for overbreadth when "it offends the constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."
o    In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.
§  Holden v. Hardy: Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns. It is elementary that it includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of it. The Constitution protects these essential attributes of property.
§  We have to consider the fact that in the posting of decals and stickers on cars and other moving vehicles, the candidate needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. In such a case, the prohibition would not only deprive the owner who consents to such posting of the decals and stickers the use of his property but more important, in the process, it would deprive the citizen of his right to free speech and information

·         The constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII, section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles. It is to be reiterated that the posting of decals and stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen becomes crucial in this kind of election propaganda not the financial resources of the candidate.
·         In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution

US vs. Guinto (Consti1)

En Banc

Cruz, February 26,1990

Topic: Sovereignty - Suits not against the state - Failure to raise immunity as defense

Facts:
  •  In the 4 consolidated suits, the USA moves to dismiss the cases on the ground that they are in effect suits against it which it has not consented
On the first suit:
  • On February 24, 1986, the Western Pacific Contracting Office, Okinawa Area Exchange, US Air Force, solicited bids for barber services contracts through its contracting officer James F. Shaw
  • Among those who submitted their bids were private respondents Roberto T. Valencia, Emerenciana C. Tanglao, and Pablo C. del Pilar
  • Bidding was won by Ramon Dizon over the objection of the private respondents who claimed that he had made a bid for 4 facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area which was not included in the invitation to bid
  • The Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX), through its representatives petitioners Yvonne Reeves and Frederic M. Smouse, upon the private respondents' complaint, explained that the Civil Engineering concession had not been awarded to Dizon
  • But Dizon was alreayd operating this concession, then known as the NCO club concession
  • On June 30, 1986, the private respondents filed a complaint in the court below to compel PHAX and the individual petitioners to cancel the award to Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for the barbershop concessions and to allow the private respondents by a writ of preliminary injunction to continue operating the concessions pending litigation
  • Respondent court directed the individual petitioners to maintain the status quo
  • On July 22, 1986, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for preliminary injunction on the ground that the action was in effect a suit against USA which had not waived its non-suability
  • On July 22, 1986, trial court denied the application for a writ of preliminary injunction
  • On Oct. 10, 1988, trial court denied the petitioners' motion to dismiss
On the second suit:
  •  Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Anthony Lamachia, Wilfredo Belsa, Rose Cartalla and Peter Orascion for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City
  • It had been ascertained that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers
  • His dismissal was effected on March 5, 1986 by Col. David C. Kimball, Commander of the 3rd Combat Support Group, PACAF Clark Air Force Base
  • Genove filed a complaint in the RTC of Baguio
  • The defendants, joined by the United States of America, moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that Lamachia (the manager) as an officer of the US Air Force was immune from suit for the acts done by him in his official capacity; they argued that the suit was in effect against USA, which had not given its consent to be sued
  • Motion was denied by respondent judge: although acting intially in their official capacities, the defendants went beyond what their functions called for; this brought them out of the protective mantle of whatever immunities they may have had in the beginning

On the third suit:
  • Luis Bautisa, who was employed as a barracks boy in Camp O'Donnell, an extension of Clark Air Base, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by the individual petitioners Tomi J. King, Darrel D. Dye and Stephen F. Bostick, officers of the US Air Force and special agents of the Air Force of Special Investigators (AFOSI)
  • Bautista was dismissed from his employment as a result of the filing of the charge
  • He then filed a complaint for damages against the individual petitioners, claiming that it was because of their acts that he was removed
  • Defendants alleged that they had only done their duty in the enforcement of laws of the Philippines inside the American bases, pursuant to the RP-US Military Bases Agreement
  •  The counsel for the defense invoked that the defendants were acting in their official capacity; that the complaint was in effect a suit against the US without its consent
  • Motion was denied by respondent judge: immunity under the Military Bases Agreement covered only criminal and not civil cases; moreover, the defendants had come under the jurisdiction of the court when they submitted their answer

On the fourth suit:
  • Complaint for damages was filed by private respondents against the petitioners (except USA)
  • According to the plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up, handcuffed the, and unleashed dogs on them
  • Defendants deny this and claim that the plaintiffs were arrested for theft and were bitten by dogs because they were struggling and resisting arrest
  • USA and the defendants argued that the suit was in effect a suit against the United States which had not given its consent to be sued; that they were also immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by them in the performance of their official functions
  • Motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court: the acts cannot be considered Acts of State, if they were ever admitted by the defendants
Issue:
  • Whether or not the suits above are in effect suits against United States of America without its consent
  • In relation, whether or not the defendants are also immune from suit for acting within their official functions.
Holding and Ratio:
  • 1st suit: No. The barbershops concessions are commercial enterprises operated by private persons. They are not agencies of the US Armed forces. Petitioners cannot plead immunity. Case should be remanded to the lower court.
  • 2nd suit: No. The petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity. The restaurants are commercial enterprises. By entering into the employment contract with Genove, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. (However, the petitioners are only suable, not liable.)
  • 3rd suit: Yes. It is clear that the petitioners were acting in the exercise of their official functions. For discharging their duties as agents of the US, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts attributable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued.
  • 4th suit: The contradictory factual allegations deserve a closer study. Inquiry must first be made by the lower court. Only after can it be known in what capacity the petitioners were acting at the time of the incident.


Saturday, June 23, 2012

Republic vs. Villasor (Consti1)

Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Hon. Guillermo P. Villasor, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, the Sheriff of the City of Manila, the Clerk of Court of First Instance of Cebu, P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation, respondents.

November 28, 1973

Fernando, J:

Facts:
  • The decision that was rendered in favor of respondents P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd, Gavino Unchuan and International Construction Corporation was declared final and executory by Respondent Hon. Guillermo P. Villasor.
  • Pursuant to the said declaration, the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution was issued. And for the strength of this writ, the provincial sheriff served notices of garnishment with several banks, specially on the 'monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the form of deposits; the Philippines Veterans Bank received the same notice of garnishment.
  • The funds of the AFP on deposit with the banks are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retireees, pay and allowances of military and civillian personnel and for maintenance and operations of AFP.
  • Petitioner filed a petition against Villasor for acting in excess jurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of a Writ of Execution against the properties of AFP, hence the notices and garnishments are null and void.
Issue:
  • Whether or not the Writ of Execution issued by respondent Judge Villasor is valid.
Held:
  • No
Ratio:
  • What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution. It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state and its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. A sovereign is exempt from suit not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.

EPG Construction Co. vs. Vigilar (Consti1)

Second Division

Buena, March 16, 2001

Topic: Sovereignty - Suits not against the State - Justice and Equity

Facts:
  • In 1983, the Ministry of Human Settlement (MHS), through the BLISS Development Corporation, intiated a housing project on a government property along the east bank of Manggahan Floodway in Pasig
  • The MHS entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with Ministry of Public Works and Highways (MPWH) where the latter undertook to develop the housing site and construct thereon 145 housing units
  • By virtue of the MOA, MPWH forged individual contracts with petitioners EPG, Ciper, Septa, Phil. Plumbing, Home Construction, World Builders, Glass World, Performance Builders, and De Leon Araneta Construction for the construction of the housing units
  • Under the contracts, the scope of construction and funding covered only around "2/3 of each housing unit"
  • Petitioners agreed to undertake and perform "additional constructions" for the completion of the housing units despite the fact that there was only a verbal promise, and not a written contract, by the MPWH Undersecretary Aber Canlas that additional funds will be available and forthcoming
  • Unpaid balance for the additional constructions amounted to P5,918,315.63
  • Upon a demand letter from the petitioners, on November 14, 1988, DPWH Asst. Secretary Madamba opined that payment of petitioners' money claims should be based on quantum meruit (what one has earned) and should be forwarded to the Commission on Audit (COA)
  • In a Letter of the Undersecretary of Budget and Management dated December 20, 1994, the amount of P5,819,316.00 was then released for the payment of the petitioners' money claims under Advise of Allotment No. A4-1303-04-41-303
  • In an indorsement dated December 27, 1995, the COA referred anew the money claims to the DPWH
  • In a letter dated August 26, 1996, respondent Secretary Gregorio Vigilar denied the subject money claims
  • Petitioners filed before the RTC of QC, Branch 226 a Petition for Mandamus to order the respondent to pay petitioners their money claims plus damages and attorney's fees.
  • Lower court denied the petition on February 18, 1997
Issue:
  1. Whether or not the implied, verbal contracts between the petitioners and then Undersecretary Canlas should be upheld
  2. Whether or not the State is immune from suit
Holding:
  1.  Yes.
  2. No.
Ratio:
  1. While the court agrees with the respondent that the implied contracts are void, in view of violation of applicable laws, auditing rules, and lack of legal requirements, it still finds merit in the instant petition
    • The illegality of the implied contracts proceeds from an express declaration or prohibition by law, not from any intrinsic illegality
    • "in the interest of substantial justice," petitioners-contractors' right to be compensated is upheld, applying the principle of quantum meruit
    • Even the DPWH Asst. Sec. for Legal Affairs recommends their compensation; even the DPWH Auditor did not object to the payment of the money claims 
2. The respondent may not conveniently hide under the State's cloak of invincibility against suit, considering that this principle yields to certain settled exceptions.
    •  The State's immunity cannot serve as an instrument perpetrating injustice
Petition granted. RTC decision reversed and set aside.

Republic vs. Feliciano (Consti1)

Republic of the Philippines, petitioner-appellee, vs. Pablo Feliciano and Intermediate Appellate Court, respondents-appellants.

March 12, 1987

Yap, J:

Facts:
  • Respondent Pablo Feliciano filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land. 
  • The trial court rendered a decision declaring Lot No. 1 to be the private property of Feliciano and the rest of the property reverted to the public domain.
  • The trial court reopened the case due to the filing of a motion to intervene and to set aside the decision of the trial court by 86 settlers, alleging that they had been in possession of the land for more than 20 years under claim of ownership.
  • The trial court ordered the settlers to present their evidence but they did not appear at the day of presentation of evidence. Feliciano, on the other hand, presented additional evidence. Thereafter, the case was submitted for decision and the trial court ruled in favor of Feliciano.
  • The settlers immediately filed a motion for reconsideration and then the case was reopened to allow them to present their evidence.
  • Feliciano filed a petition for certiorari with the Appellate Court but it was denied.
  • The settlers filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Republic of the Philippines cannot be sued without its consent and hence the action cannot prosper. The motion was opposed by Feliciano.
Issue:
  • Whether or not the state can be sued for recovery and possession of a parcel of land.
Held:
  • No
Ratio:
  • A suit against the state is not permitted, except upon a showing that the state has consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted.
  • The complaint involves land not owned by the state but private land belonging to Feliciano, hence the government is not being divested of any of its properties.

De Los Santos vs. IAC (Consti1)

Emiliano R. De Los Santos, Spouses Norma A. Padilla and Isidoro L. Padilla and the Heirs of Francisco Dayrit, petitioners, vs. The Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, Hon. Judge Cicerro C. Jurado and Edilberto Cadiente, respondents.

Third Division

Romero, June 2, 1993

Topic: Sovereignty - Suits not against the State - Expropriation 

Facts: 
  • Petitioners are co-owners of a parcel of land in Barrio Wawa, Binangonan, Rizal (area: 19,061 sq m)
  • Petitioners allege that in October 1981, without their knowledge or consent, Lorenzo Cadiente, a private contractor and the Provincial Engineer of Rizal constructed a road 9 meters wide and 128.70 meters long occupying 1,165 sq m of their parcel of land
  • Aside from the road, an artificial creek 23.20 meters wide and 128.69 meters long was also constructed, occupying an area of 2,906 sq m of their property
  • Constructed in a zigzag manner, the creak meandered through their property
  • Petitioners files two cases which were later consolidated
  • Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss both cases several grounds, including that both cases were in reality suits against the state which could not be maintained without the State's consent
  • The lower court dismissed the petition; petitioners elevated the case to the SC on certiorari, which referred the cases back to the IAC
  • IAC ruled: the two actions cannot be maintained because they are suits against the State without consent
  • Case was again elevated to the SC on certiorari
 Issue:
  • Whether or not the consolidated actions, as suits against the State, can be maintained
Holding:
  •  Yes.
Ratio:
  •  The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen; it cannot serve as defense by the State against an action for payment by the owner
  • The respondent government officials executed a shortcut in appropriating petitioners' property for public use; no expropriation proceedings had been undertaken prior to the construction of the projects
  • Damages may be awarded the petitioners in the form of legal interest on the price of the land to be reckoned from the time of the unlawful taking
Petition granted. Civil Cases remanded to the lower court for trial on the merits after the Republic of the Philippines shall have been impleaded as defendant in both cases.

Lansang vs. Court of Appeals (Consti1)

Amado J. Lansang, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals, General Assembly of the Blind, Inc., and Jose Iglesias, respondents.

February 23, 2000

Quisumbing, J:

Facts:
  • Private respondent General Assembly of the Blind (GABI) were allegedly awarded a verbal contract of lease in Rizal Park by the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC). However, this verbal contract accommodation was unclear because there was no document or instrument involved.
  • With the change of government, the new Chairman of NPDC, petitioner Amado J. Lansang, sought to clean up Rizal Park and terminated the said verbal agreement with GABI and demanded that they vacate the area.
  • The notice was signed by the president of GABI, private respondent Jose Iglesias, allegedly to indicate his conformity to its contents but later on claimed that he was deceived into signing the notice.
  • On the day of the supposed eviction, GABI filed an action for damages and injunction in the RTC against the petitioner but it was dismissed, ruling that the complaint was actually directed against the state which could not be sued without its consent.
  • On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and ruled that a government official being sued in his official capacity is not enough to protest such official from liability for acts done without or in excess of his authority.
Issues:
  • Whether or not private respondents' complaint against petitioner Lansang, as Chairman of NPDC, is in effect a suit against the state which cannot be sued without its consent.
  • Whether or not petitioner Lansang abused his authority in ordering the ejectment of private respondents from Rizal Park.
Held:
  • No, the complaint is not a suit against the state.
  • No, Lansang did not abuse his authority.
Ratio:
  • The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against public officials for acts done in the performance of their duties. The rule is that the suit must be regarded as one against the state where satisfaction of the judgment against the public official concerned will require the state itself to perform a positive act. 
    • Lansang was sued not in his capacity as NPDC Chairman but in his personal capacity. It is evident from the complaint that Lansang was sued allegedly for having personal motives in ordering the ejectment of GABI from Rizal Park.
  • There was no evidence of abuse of authority.