Monday, June 25, 2012

US v. Ruiz (Consti1)


US v. Ruiz
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS and ROBERT GOHIER, petitioners, vs. HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Rizal and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN & CO., INC., respondents.
En Banc
Doctrine: implied consent
Date: May 22, 1985
Ponente: Justice Abad-Santos

Facts:

  • At times material to this case, the United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States.
  • US invited the submission of bids for Repair offender system and Repair typhoon damages. Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation, submitted bids and complied with the requests based on the letters received from the US.
  • In June 1972, a letter was received by the Eligio De Guzman & Co indicating that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay.
  • The company sued the United States of America and Messrs. James E. Galloway, William I. Collins and Robert Gohier all members of the Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy. The complaint is to order the defendants to allow the plaintiff to perform the work on the projects and, in the event that specific performance was no longer possible, to order the defendants to pay damages. The company also asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from entering into contracts with third parties for work on the projects.
  • The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of questioning the jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the complaint and the persons of defendants, the subject matter of the complaint being acts and omissions of the individual defendants as agents of defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign which has not given her consent to this suit or any other suit for the causes of action asserted in the complaint." (Rollo, p. 50.)
  • Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which included an opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The company opposed the motion.
  • The trial court denied the motion and issued the writ. The defendants moved twice to reconsider but to no avail.
  • Hence the instant petition which seeks to restrain perpetually the proceedings in Civil Case No. 779-M for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.
Issue/s:

  • WON the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity

Held:
 WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the questioned orders of the respondent judge are set aside and Civil Case No. is dismissed. Costs against the private respondent.

Ratio:
  • The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperil (sovereign & governmental acts)
  • The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
  • correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal nature of the act

Malong v. PNR (Consti1)



Malong v. PNR

FRANCISCO MALONG and ROSALINA AQUINOMALONG, petitioners v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS and COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PANGASINAN, Lingayen Branch 11, respondents


En Banc

Doctrine: implied consent

Date: August 7, 1985

Ponente: Justice Aquino


Facts:
  • The Malong spouses alleged in their complaint that on October 30, 1977 their son, Jaime Aquino, a paying passenger, was killed when he fell from a PNR train while it was between Tarlac and Capas. The tragedy occurred because Jaime had to sit near the door of a coach. The train was overloaded with passengers and baggage in view of the proximity of All Saints Day. 
  • The Malong spouses prayed that the PNR be ordered to pay them damages totaling P136,370. 
  • Upon the Solicitor General's motion, the trial court dismissed the complaint. It ruled that it had no jurisdiction because the PNR, being a government instrumentality, the action was a suit against the State (Sec. 16, Art. XV of the Constitution). 
  • The Malong spouses appealed to this Court pursuant to Republic Act No. 5440 
    • R.A. No. 5440 changed the mode of appeal from courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts) to the Supreme Court in cases involving only questions of law, or the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, etc. or the legality of any tax, impost, assessment or toll, etc., or the jurisdiction of any inferior court, from ordinary appeal — i.e., by notice of appeal, record on appeal and appeal bond, under Rule 41— to appeal by certiorari, under Rule 45 
Issue/s:
  1. WON PNR is immune from suit. 
  2. WON the State acted in a sovereign capacity or in a corporate capacity when it organized the PNR for the purpose of engaging in transportation 
  3. WON the State acted differently when it organized the PNR as successor of the Manila Railroad Company 


Held: No, PNR is NOT immune. The State divested itself of its sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR which is no different from its predecessor, the Manila Railroad Company. The PNR did not become immune from suit. It did not remove itself from the operation of articles 1732 to 1766 of the Civil Code on common carriers

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal is reversed and set aside. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Costs against the Philippine National Railways.



Ratio:
  • The correct rule is that "not all government entities, whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from suit is determined by the character of the objects for which the entity was organized." (Nat. Airports Corp. vs. Teodoro and Phil. Airlines, Inc., 91 Phil. 203, 206; Santos vs, Santos, 92 Phil. 281, 285; Harry Lyons, Inc. vs. USA, 104 Phil. 593.) 
  • Suits against State agencies with respect to matters in which they have assumed to act in a private or non-governmental capacity are not suits against the State 
  • Like any private common carrier, the PNR is subject to the obligations of persons engaged in that private enterprise. It is not performing any governmental function 
  • The point is that when the government enters into a commercial business it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other private corporation (Bank of the U.S. vs. Planters' Bank, 9 Wheat. 904, 6 L. ed. 244, cited in Manila Hotel Employees Association vs. Manila Hotel Company, et al., 73 Phil. 374, 388). 
  • There is not one law for the sovereign and another for the subject, but when the sovereign engages in business and the conduct of business enterprises, and contracts with individuals, whenever the contract in any form comes before the courts, the rights and obligation of the contracting parties must be adjusted upon the same principles as if both contracting parties were private persons. Both stand upon equality before the law, and the sovereign is merged in the dealer, contractor and suitor (People vs. Stephens, 71 N.Y. 549). 
  • Justice Abad Santos (Separate Opinion) : All corporations organized by the government are its instrumentality by the very reason of their creation. But that fact alone does not invest them with immunity from suit.

People v. Echegaray (CRIM1)


People of the Philippines v. Leo Echegaray y Pilo
People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee v.  Leo Echegaray y Pilo, Defendant Appellant

Per Curiam
Doctrine: Neither excessive fines nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
Date: February 7, 1997
Ponente: As it is a Per curiam decision, the court is acting collectively & anonymously.

Facts:

  • The SC rendered a decision in the instant case affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant for the crime of raping his ten-year old daughter. 
  • The crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death.
  • The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration which focused on the sinister motive of the victim's grandmother that precipitated the filing of the alleged false accusation of rape against the accused.  The motion was dismissed as the SC found no substantial arguments on the said motion that can disturb the verdict.
  • On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and retained the services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group of the Philippines. (FLAG)
  • A supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accused-appellant aiming for the reversal of the death sentence.
  • In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main issues: (1) mixed factual and legal matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2) alleged incompetence of accused-appellant's former counsel; and (3) purely legal question of the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.
Issue/s: WON the death penalty law (RA no. 7659) is unconstitutional

Held: No.
Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration & supplemental motion for reconsideration are denied for lack of merit.

Ratio:
  • Accused-appellant first claims that the death penalty is per se a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment as ruled by the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia. To state, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court, in Furman, categorically ruled that the death penalty is a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, is misleading and inaccurate.
    • The issue in Furman was not so much death penalty itself but the arbitrariness pervading the procedures by which the death penalty was imposed on the accused by the sentencing jury.  Thus, the defense theory in Furman centered not so much on the nature of the death penalty as a criminal sanction but on the discrimination against the black accused who is meted out the death penalty by a white jury that is given the unconditional discretion to determine whether or not to impose the death penalty.
    • Furman, thus, did not outlaw the death penalty because it was cruel and unusual per se.  While the U.S. Supreme Court nullified all discretionary death penalty statutes in Furman, it did so because the discretion which these statutes vested in the trial judges and sentencing juries was uncontrolled and without any parameters, guidelines, or standards intended to lessen, if not altogether eliminate, the intervention of personal biases, prejudices and discriminatory acts on the part of the trial judges and sentencing juries.
  • accused-appellant asseverates that the death penalty is a cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment for the crime of rape mainly because the latter, unlike murder, does not involve the taking of life.  
    • In support of his contention, accused-appellant largely relies on the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in Coker v. Georgia:: "Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public, it does not compare with murder, which does involve the unjustified taking of human life.  Although it may be accompanied by another crime, rape by definition does not include the death of or even the serious injury to another person.  The murderer kills; the rapist, if no more than that, does not.  Life is over for the victim of the murderer; for the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is not over and normally is not beyond repair.  We have the abiding conviction that the death penalty, which 'is unique in its severity and irrevocability' x x x  is an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take human life"
    • The U.S. Supreme Court based its foregoing ruling on two grounds: 
      • first, that the public has manifested its rejection of the death penalty as a proper punishment for the crime of rape through the willful omission by the state legislatures to include rape in their new death penalty statutes in the aftermath of Furman;
        • Phil. SC: Anent the first ground, we fail to see how this could have any bearing on the Philippine experience and in the context of our own culture.
      • second, that rape, while concededly a dastardly contemptuous violation of a woman's spiritual integrity, physical privacy, and psychological balance, does not involve the taking of life.
        • Phil. SC: we disagree with the court's predicate that the gauge of whether or not a crime warrants the death penalty or not, is the attendance of the circumstance of death on the part of the victim.  Such a premise is in fact an ennobling of the biblical notion of retributive justice of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth".
  •  The Revised Penal Code, as it was originally promulgated, provided for the death penalty in specified crimes under specific circumstances.  As early as 1886, though, capital punishment had entered our legal system through the old Penal Code, which was a modified version of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870.
  • Under the Revised Penal Code, death is the penalty for the crimes of treason, correspondence with the enemy during times of war, qualified piracy, parricide, murder, infanticide, kidnapping, rape with homicide or with the use of deadly weapon or by two or more persons resulting in insanity, robbery with homicide, and arson resulting in death.
  • The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of a constitutional question of whether or not the death penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment in violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual punishment
    • Harden v. Director of Prison- "The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive.  In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the United States Supreme Court said that 'punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution.  It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life.
    • People v. Limaco- "x x x there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the supreme penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective.  However, as long as that penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their private opinions,"
  • Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that congress, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, may re-impose the death penalty.  Nothing in the said provision imposes a requirement that for a death penalty bill to be valid, a positive manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime should first be perceived and statistically proven following the suspension of the death penalty.  Neither does the said provision require that the death penalty be resorted to as a last recourse when all other criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in society
    • what R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the Congress, in the interest of justice, public order and rule of law, and the need to rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to impose the death penalty for said crimes.
    • Heinous crime is an act or series of acts which, by the flagrantly violent manner in which the same was committed or by the reason of its inherent viciousness, shows a patent disregard and mockery of the law, public peace and order, or public morals.  It is an offense whose essential and inherent viciousness and atrocity are repugnant and outrageous to a civilized society and hence, shock the moral self of a people.
  • The right of a person is not only to live but to live a quality life, and this means that the rest of society is obligated to respect his or her individual personality, the integrity and the sanctity of his or her own physical body, and the value he or she puts in his or her own spiritual, psychological, material and social preferences and needs. 
    • Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention where the victim is detained for more than three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.
  • SC: the death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes because:
    • the perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably execrable acts that have so deeply dehumanized a person or criminal acts with severely destructive effects on the national efforts to lift the masses from abject poverty through organized governmental strategies based on a disciplined and honest citizenry
    • they have so caused irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim and the society and a repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to the safety of individuals and the survival of government, they must be permanently prevented from doing so
  • People v. Cristobal:  "Rape is the forcible violation of the sexual intimacy of another person. It does injury to justice and charity.  Rape deeply wounds the respect, freedom, and physical and moral integrity to which every person has a right.  It causes grave damage that can mark the victim for life. It is always an intrinsically evil act xxx an outrage upon decency and dignity that hurts not only the victim but the society itself.


Sunday, June 24, 2012

Magno vs. CA (Crim1)

Oriel Magno, petitioner, vs. Honorable Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines, respondents.

June 26, 1992

Paras, J:

Facts:
  • Oriel Magno, lacking fund in acquiring complete set of equipment to make his car repair shop operational, approached Corazon Teng, Vice President of Mancor Industries.
  • VP Teng referred Magno to LS Finance and Management Corporation, advising its Vice President, Joey Gomez, that Mancor was willing to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS Finance could accommodate Magno and and provide him credit facilities.
  • The arrangement went on requiring Magno to pay 30% of the total amount of the equipment as warranty deposit but Magno couldn't afford to pay so he requested VP Gomez to look for third party who could lend him that amount.
  • Without Magno's knowledge, Corazon was the one who provided that amount.
  • As payment to the equipment, Magno issued six checks, two of them were cleared and the rest had no sufficient fund.
  • Because of the unsuccessful venture, Magno failed to pay LS Finance which then pulled out the equipment.
  • Magno was charged of violation of BP Blg. 2 (The Bouncing Checks Law) and found guilty.
Issue:
  • Whether or not Magno should be punished for the issuance of the checks in question.
Held:
  • No
Ratio: 
  • To charge Magno for the refund of a warranty deposit which he did not withdraw as it was not his own account, it having remained with LS Finance, is to even make him pay an unjust debt since he did not receive the amount in question. All the while, said amount was in the safekeeping of the financing company which is managed by the officials and employees of LS Finance.

People vs. Oanis (Crim1)

The People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta, defendant-appellants.

July 27, 1943

Moran, J:

Facts:
  • Chief of Police Antonio Oanis and Corporal Alberto Galanta were instructed by the Constabulary Provincial Inspector to arrest the escaped convict, Anselmo Balagtas, with bailarina named Irene, and if overpowered, to get him dead or alive.
  • Upon arrival at the place where Irene could be found, Oanis approached and asked Brigada Mallare where Irene's room was. Brigada indicated the room and said that Irene was sleeping with her paramour.
  • Oanis and Galanta then went to the room and upon seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the door, they simultaneously fired at him.
  • Shocked by the entire scene, Irene fainted.
  • It turned out later that the man shot and killed was not Balagtas but an innocent man named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour.
Issue:
  • Whether or not Oanis and Galanta can be held responsible for Tecson's death.
Held:
  • Yes
Ratio:
  • No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention. A peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary or unreasonable force in making an arrest.
    • Through impatience of desire to take chances, Oanis and Galanta have exceeded in the fulfillment of their duty by killing the person whom they believed to be Balagtas without any resistance from him and without making any previous inquiry as to his identity.

People v. De La Cruz (Crim1)


People of the Philippines v. Pablo De La Cruz
People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Pablo De La Cruz, Defendant Appellant

En Banc
Doctrine: Neither excessive fines nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
Keywords: excessive fines
Date: April 17, 1953
Ponente: Justice Bengzon

Facts: 

  • In the morning of October 14, 1950, Eduardo Bernardo, Jr. went to the De La Cruz's store in Sampaloc, Manila, and purchased from him a six-ounce tin of "Carnation" milk for thirty centavos. 
  • As the purchase had been made for Ruperto Austria, who was not in good terms with Pablo de la Cruz the matter reached the City Fiscal's office and resulted in this criminal prosecution, because Executive Order No. 331 (issued by authority of Republic Act No. 509) fixed 20 centavos as the maximum price for that kind of commodity.
  • Republic Act No. 509 provides in part as follows:
    • SEC. 12. Imprisonment for a period of not less two months nor more than twelve years or a fine of not less than two thousand pesos nor more than ten thousand pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who sells any article, goods, or commodity in excess of the maximum selling price fixed by the president; . . . .
    • In addition to the penalties prescribed above, the persons, corporations, partnerships, or associations found guilty of any violation of this Act or of any rule or regulations issued by the president pursuant to this Act shall be barred from the wholesome and retail business for a period of five years for a first offense, and shall be permanently barred for the second or succeeding offenses.
  • Having retailed a can of milk at ten centavos more than the ceiling price, Pablo de la Cruz was sentenced, after trial, in the court of first instance of Manila, to imprisonment for five years, and to pay a fine of five thousand pesos plus costs. He was also barred from engaging in wholesale and retail business for five years.

Issue/s:
  1. WON the trial judge erred in imposing a punishment wholly disproportionate to the offence
  2. WON the trial judge erred in not invalidating RA No. 509 in so far as it prescribed excessive penalties.
    1. Is imprisonment for two months or fine of two thousand pesos too excessive for a merchant who sells goods at prices beyond the ceilings established in the Executive Order?
    2. Is five years and five thousand pesos, cruel and unusual for a violation that merely netted a ten-centavo profit to the accused?



Held: We may decrease the penalty, exercising that discretion vested in the courts by the same statutory enactment. Wherefore, reducing the imprisonment to six months and the fine to two thousand pesos, we hereby affirm the appealed decision in all other respects.


Ratio:

  • The constitution directs that "Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."
    •  The prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and apply to punishment which never existed in America of which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete (15 Am. Jur., p. 172), for instance those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like (15 Am. Jur., supra, Note 35 L.R.A. p. 561). 
    • Fine and imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition.
  • However, there are respectable authorities holding that the inhibition applies as well to punishments that although not cruel and unusual in nature, may be so severe as to fall within the fundamental restriction. (15 Am. Jur., p. 178)
  • For the purposes of this decision, we may assume, without actually holding, that too long a prison term might clash with the Philippine Constitution. But that brings up again two opposing theories
    • we are told the prohibition applies to legislation only, and not to the courts' decision imposing penalties within the limits of the statute (15 Am. Jur., "Criminal Law" sec. 526). 
      • the section would violate the Constitution, if the penalty is excessive under any and all circumstances, the minimum being entirely out of proportion to the kind of offenses prescribed
        • Is imprisonment for two months or fine of two thousand pesos too excessive for a merchant who sells goods at prices beyond the ceilings established in the Executive Order?
        • NO. because in overstepping the price barriers Dela Cruz might derive, in some instances, profits amounting to thousands of pesos
        • The prison term must be so disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of all reasonable men as to what is right and proper under the circumstances (lb.). 
    • authorities are not lacking to the effect that the fundamental prohibition likewise restricts the judge's power and authority
      • The second theory would contrast the penalty imposed by the court with the gravity of the particular crime or misdemeanor, and if notable disparity results, it would apply the constitutional brake, even if the statute would, under other circumstances, be not extreme or oppressive.
      • Is five years and five thousand pesos, cruel and unusual for a violation that merely netted a ten-centavo profit to the accused?
      • NO.
      • In our opinion the damage caused to the State is not measured exclusively by the gains obtained by the accused, inasmuch as one violation would mean others, and the consequential breakdown of the beneficial system of price controls.



People of the Philippines v. Carlos (CRIM1)

Note: didn't include all arguments of Carlos. Only included the one abt equal protection.


People of the Philippines v. Carlos
People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Apolonio Carlos, Defendant Appellant



En Banc
Doctrine: Due process & equal protection
Keywords: Equal Protection
Date: June 30, 1947
Ponente: Justice Tuason

Facts: 
  • The appellant was found guilty of treason by the People's Court and sentenced to reclusion perpetua, to pay a fine of P7,000, and costs.
    • background lang on why: The lower court found that one day in July or August, 1944, about two or three o'clock in the morning, a truck pulled up to the curb in front of a house on Constancia Street, Sampaloc, Manila, where one Martin Mateo lived. From the truck the accused, a Japanese spy, alighted together with members of the Japanese military police and pointed Martin Mateo's house and Fermin Javier's house to his Japanese companions, whereupon the Japanese soldiers broke into Martin Mateo's dwelling first and Fermin Javier's afterwards. In those houses they seized Martin Mateo, Ladislao Mateo and Fermin Javier, bound their hands, and put them in the truck. Along with other persons who had been rounded up in the other places and who had been kept in the truck while it was parked, they were taken to Fort Santiago where the two Mateos and Fermin Javier were tortured and from which they were released six days later. The reason for the arrest and maltreatment of Martin and Ladislao Mateo was that they had refused to divulge the whereabouts of their brother, Marcelino Mateo, who was a guerrilla and who had escaped from the Japanese. And Fermin Javier was arrested and tortured because he himself was a guerrilla, a fact which Carlos knew or at least suspected.
  • Carlos alleged that the law creating the People's Court is unconstitutional; that numerous provisions of the People's Court Act are singled out as contrary to the Organic Law


Issue: WON the People's Court Act (PCA) is unconstitutional.

Held: No. The judgment of the lower court is affirmed with costs against appellant.

Ratio:
  • Carlos argued that The PCA contained
  • provisions which deal on matters entirely foreign to the subject matter expressed in its 
  • title, such as: 
    • (1) a provision which retains the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance;
    • (2) a provision which adds to the disqualification of Justices of the Supreme Court 
    • and provides a procedure for their substitution; 
    • (3) a provision which changed the 
    • existing Rules of Court on the subject of bail, and 
    • (4) a provision which suspends 
    • Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
    • Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Municipality of Binalonan: The People's Court was intended to be a full and complete scheme with its own machinery for the indictment, trial and judgment of treason case. The various provisos mentioned, in our opinion, are allied and germane to the subject matter and purposes of the People's Court Act; they are subordinate to its end. The multitude of matters which the legislation, by its nature, has to embrace would make mention of all of them in the title of the act cumbersome. It is not necessary, and the Congress is not expected, to make the title of an enactment a complete index of its contents.
    • SC: The constitutional rule is satisfied if all parts of a law relate to the subject expressed in its title.
  • Carlos also argued that PCA deprives persons similarly situated of the equal protection of the laws inasmuch as:
    • (1) Only those political offenders against whom cases are filed within six months from the passage of the law are to be tried in the People's Court, while others are to be tried in the Courts of First Instance;
      • SC: The People's Court is a court of special and restricted jurisdiction created under the stress of an emergency and national security. It was devised to operate for a limited period only, a limitation imposed by economic necessity and other factors of public policy. Obviously, the main concerning the creation of a special court was the trial and and disposition of the cases, numbering over 6,000, of accused who were being held by the United States military authorities and who were to be turned over to the Commonwealth Government.
    • (2) Political offenders accused in the People's Court are denied preliminary examination and/or investigation whereas the others who shall be entitled thereto;
      • SC:  Section 22 in denying preliminary investigation to persons accused before the People's Court is justified by the conditions prevailing when the law was enacted. In view of the great number of prisoners then under detention and the length of time and amount of labor that would be consumed if so many prisoners were allowed the right to have preliminary investigation, considered with the necessity of disposing of these cases at the earliest possible dates in the interest of the public and of the accused themselves, it was not an unwise measure which dispensed with such investigation in such cases. Preliminary investigation, it must be remembered, is not a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution.
    • (3) Political offenders accused in the People's Court have limited right to appeal, while those who may be accused of the same crimes in the Courts of First Instance have absolute right of appeal inasmuch as under section 13 of the law, Rules 42 and 46 of the Rules of Court are made applicable to the latter;
      • SC: The People's Court is a collegiate court whereas the Court of First Instance is presided over by a single judge. Appeal is not a constitutional but statutory right. The admitted fact that there is no discrimination among appeals from the same court or class of court saves the provision objected to from being unconstitutional
    • (4) Appeals in the case involving persons who held any office or position under either or both the Philippine Executive Commission and the Philippine Republic or any branch, instrumentality and/or agency thereof are to heard and decided by a substantially different Supreme Court, thus causing lack of informity in rulings over the same subject;
      • SC: This objection does not seem to fall within the subject of constitutional guarantee against deprivation of equal protection of the laws. Be that as it may, we find no merit in the appellant's contention. 
      • SC: The disqualification under the People's Court Act of some or a majority of the members of this Court and their substitution by justices of the Court of Appeals or judges of the Courts of First Instance do not make the Supreme Court, as thus constituted, a new court in the eyes of the law. 
      • SC: A court is an entity possessing a personality separate and distinct from the men who compose or sit on it. This objection is no more valid than that of a party in an ordinary action who protests that his case is heard by a Supreme Court which, by reason of disability of a majority of its regular members, is made up mostly of judges from outside. 
      • SC: As to the "lack of uniformity in rulings over the same subject," it need only be said that the Constitution does not insure uniformity of judicial decisions; neither does it assure immunity from judicial error.
    • (5) The first proviso of section 19 thereof prescribes a different rule as to the granting of release on bail only with respect to the political offenders detained by the United States Army and released to the Commonwealth of the Philippines but not as to others political offenders accused or accusable of the same crimes; and
    • (6) The second proviso of section 19 thereof suspends article 125 of the Revised Penal Code only as to those political detainees released by the United States Army to the Commonwealth of the Philippines or, at most, only to those accused or accusable of the crimes specified in the law and not as to all persons accused or accusable of crimes against national security committed during the second world war, much less to all offenders, notwithstanding the fact that there is no reasonable and real difference among said groups of offenders.
      • SC: (5) and (6) The two provisos in section 19 do no constitute denial of equal protection of the laws. The distinction made by these provisos between two sets of accused in the "granting or release on bail" and in the application of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code are not arbitrary or fanciful calculated to favor or prejudice one or the other class.
      • Laurel vs. Misa (76 Phil., 372): this Court explained the reasons which necessitated the extension to six months of the authorized detention of persons charged with treason before filing of information. The provisos rest "on some real and substantial difference or distinction bearing a just and fair relation to the legislation."
  • Carlos argued that (c) It is a bill of attainder in that it virtually imposes upon specific, known and identified individuals or group of individual, the penalty of detention and imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months without any form of judicial trial or procedure
    • Cummings vs. Missouri: The bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial."
    • SC: Detention of a prisoner for a period not exceeding six months pending investigation or trial is not a punishment but a necessary extension of the well-recognized power to hold the criminal suspected for investigation